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Fourth Amendment cases are replete with references to “purpose.” 
Typically, these references pertain to the motivations of individual officers 
and occasionally to those of public institutions. That courts pay attention to 
purpose is unsurprising. Across many areas of law, an alleged wrongdoer’s 
intentions are often critical to determining liability, a remedy, or both. 
Purpose analysis in Fourth Amendment cases, however, is surprisingly 
confused. The Supreme Court has, without explanation, advanced separate 
frameworks for analyzing purpose—objective, subjective, and 
programmatic. The only consistent thing about the three approaches is that 
they all fail to ensure that law enforcement agents behave transparently and 
honestly. The failure is particularly worrisome because of the increasingly 
salient role that purpose analysis has played in recent Supreme Court 
cases. 
This Article contends that courts and policy makers should use 
purpose as an ex ante institutional design principle. This would be in stark 
contrast to its current role as a judicial device for ascertaining an actor’s 
past motivations. A single enforcement bureaucracy should not be 
responsible for too broad a range of functions, particularly if those 
functions implicate very different levels of state coercion—for example, 
enforcing felony narcotics laws as opposed to traffic laws. Modern police 
departments tend to have sprawling mandates that sometimes make it 
impossible for policy makers and officers to differentiate and rank distinct 
goals. Mandate sprawl is particularly problematic because it creates 
opportunities for pretextual searches and seizures—police have access to a 
broad range of rationales to justify conduct actually carried out for 
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impermissible motives. Were enforcement bureaucracies required to 
differentiate enforcement activities by purpose, it would go a long way in 
curing this problem. 
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Fourth Amendment cases are replete with references to “purpose.” 
Typically, the term pertains to an individual officer’s motivations for 
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having undertaken specific acts.1 Occasionally, it pertains to a public 
institution’s motivations for having undertaken a policy or practice.2 That 
courts pay attention to state actors’ intentions in Fourth Amendment cases 
is unsurprising. Across many areas of law, an alleged wrongdoer’s 
intentions are often critical to determining liability, a remedy, or both. What 
is surprising is how confused and inconsistent the Supreme Court’s analysis 
of purpose is in Fourth Amendment cases. The Court uses entirely different 
frameworks for evaluating purpose in different kinds of cases. Not only 
does the Court fail to explain why it embraces different frameworks in 
different contexts, but the only consistent thing about these approaches is 
that they all fail to ensure that law enforcement agents behave transparently 
and honestly. The failure is particularly worrisome because of the 
increasingly salient role that purpose analysis has played in recent Supreme 
Court cases.3 
Recent opinions exemplify the conceptual murk surrounding purpose 
and the Fourth Amendment. In Jardines v. Florida, the Court concluded 
that it was a Fourth Amendment “search” for a police officer to walk a 
“narcotics dog” up to the front door of a house to sniff for drugs.4 Thus, the 
officer’s failure to obtain a warrant beforehand violated the Fourth 
Amendment.5 The Court has increasingly relied upon trespass principles to 
assess whether a state agent’s conduct was a “search.”6 This approach 
requires evaluating the state agent’s purpose for “occup[ying] private 
property.”7 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia concluded that the 
officer’s purpose for approaching Jardines’s front door was to conduct a 
criminal search.8 The Court was careful to qualify that its inquiry into 
officer purpose was “objective.”9 The Court often qualifies its analysis of 
 
1  See, e.g., Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1134–35 (2013); Jardines v. 
Florida, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1416–17 (2013); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404–05 
(2006); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811–13 (1996); Horton v. California, 496 
U.S. 128, 138 (1990); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371–72 (1986). 
2  See, e.g., Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1978–80 (2013); California v. Quon, 560 
U.S. 746, 761 (2010); Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 81–84 (2001); Chandler v. 
Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322 (1997); Vernonia School Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995); 
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 708–10 (1987). 
3  See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (noting that the Government 
installed GPS on a suspect’s vehicle “for the purpose of obtaining information”). 
4  Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416–17. 
5  Id. at 1417. 
6  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949–50. 
7  Id. 
8  Jardines, 133 S. Ct at 1417–18. 
9  Id. at 1417. 
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officer purpose in this way, noting the practical difficulties of ascertaining 
an individual officer’s subjective intentions.10 While the Court’s analysis of 
purpose in Jardines bears some resemblance to state of mind in criminal 
law, the analogy is inapt because the assessment of purpose in criminal law 
requires subjective analysis.11 As noted by the Jardines dissenters, what 
“objective purpose” means is unclear.12 
The Court’s framework for analyzing institutional purpose is also 
confused, but for different reasons. The Court’s so-called programmatic-
purpose inquiry has the air of doctrinal afterthought.13 The Court casts these 
cases as “exceptions” to the Fourth Amendment’s general requirement that 
there be individualized suspicion for a search or seizure.14 For example, in 
Maryland v. King, the Court recently upheld suspicionless collection of 
DNA from arrestees.15 The Court concluded that Maryland’s legislative 
purpose in enacting the scheme was “administrative” as opposed to 
“criminal.”16 The Court credited Maryland’s argument that the scheme’s 
purpose was to enable law enforcement to accurately identify suspects for 
booking.17 In dissent, Justice Scalia objected, stating that the majority 
ignored the most obvious purpose for the Maryland scheme: solving open 
criminal cases where there was a sample of suspect DNA.18 Crediting that 
purpose, however, would have made it impossible to uphold the Maryland 
scheme because a search for criminal evidence requires individualized 
suspicion that the suspect committed a crime.19 More broadly, the 
programmatic-purpose analysis in King bears no resemblance to the 
objective purpose analysis in Jardines. King bears much greater 
resemblance to the kind of deferential, “rational basis” review that one 
might see in other constitutional law contexts. This, however, is puzzling 
 
10  See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 405 (2006) (qualifying “even if their 
subjective motives could be so neatly unraveled”); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 
814–15 (1996) (noting “the evidentiary difficulty of establishing subjective intent”). 
11  See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (defining purpose). 
12  Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1423–24 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
13  See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 45–47 (2000) (distinguishing 
“programmatic purpose” from “subjective intentions,” which earlier opinions had held were 
not to be considered in Fourth Amendment cases). 
14  See, e.g., id. at 37 (summarizing cases). More specifically, the Court has developed its 
programmatic purpose framework in the context of the so-called administrative and special 
needs exceptions. For a fuller description, see infra Section I.C. 
15  Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013). 
16  Id. at 1971–72. 
17  Id. at 1971–74. 
18  Id. at 1982–83 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
19  Id. at 1983. 
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given the Court’s statements in other cases that the programmatic-purpose 
inquiry requires a searching analysis of an actor’s actual motivations.20 
This Article offers a critical account of purpose’s role in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. First, it critiques the frameworks the Court 
currently uses for evaluating purpose in Fourth Amendment cases. Second, 
it offers a novel account of why the Court relies on different notions in the 
individual and institutional decisionmaking contexts. The Court’s pervasive 
but confused reliance on purpose in Fourth Amendment cases reflects 
constitutional criminal procedure’s awkward role mediating between 
criminal law and constitutional law. In each of these two fields, purpose has 
a long and distinct conceptual lineage. In criminal law, purpose is a form of 
mens rea. In constitutional law, purpose is a method of evaluating the 
relationship between a state’s goals and the means by which it achieves 
those goals.21 In Fourth Amendment cases, the Court uses purpose in a 
manner that echoes both approaches, but only faintly. 
The typical Fourth Amendment case presents a constitutional harm as 
realized between two individuals, one of whom is a police officer.22 Such 
“transactional framing” of disputes has generated constitutional principles 
that seem writ small23—that is, narrow rules designed for officers’ conduct 
in the field rather than broad principles of institutional design.24 The 
purpose analysis that has evolved in these cases has the air of state-of-mind 
analysis in criminal law. Police officers, however, are no ordinary 
individuals. They are state agents. The point of a Fourth Amendment 
suppression motion is to determine evidence’s admissibility, not to punish 
individual officers for having behaved badly. The Court seems to recognize 
 
20  See Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080–81 (2011) (citing United States v. 
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 (2001)); see also City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 
46–47 (2000). 
21  See infra notes 321–337 and discussion (discussing First and Fourteenth 
Amendments). 
22  See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140 (1978) (requiring that defendant have 
suffered personal injury for standing to assert to Fourth Amendment claim). 
23  I borrow this expression from Daryl Levinson who uses it to describe courts’ and 
commentators’ tendencies to conceptualize constitutional disputes as if realized between real 
persons when they are not. Daryl Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 
111 YALE L.J. 1311, 1314 (2002). See also infra Section II.A.3. 
24  This is likely why both courts and commentators tend to address the Fourth 
Amendment as if its underlying concerns were distinct from constitutional law more 
generally. See Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment 
Theory, 41 UCLA L. REV. 199, 200 (1993); Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies 
in Criminal Adjudication, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2001, 2001–02 (1998); see also Akhil Reed 
Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1131–33 (1991). 
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this by insisting that its analysis of officer purpose is objective.25 By so 
insisting, the Court rejects a subjective approach that evaluates a state 
agent’s actual motivations. But that does not explain what objective purpose 
means. 
This Article contends that officers perpetrate a hoax of constitutional 
significance whenever they behave pretextually—that is, when they act on 
the basis of unconstitutional motives, but later claim some objective 
rationale for their conduct. Because objective purpose cannot screen for this 
kind of officer duplicity or confusion, it fails to meaningfully constrain 
officer conduct. Although the expression suggests a concept with roots in 
criminal law or torts, it has neither. Rather, it is a rhetorical device for 
imputing the state’s broad, corporate intentionality to individual officers. 
This is to conceive of individual officers, vis-à-vis individual citizens, as 
the state incarnate. The argument is bolstered by the rare case in which the 
Court permits analysis of officers’ subjective motivations—for example, 
when the Fourth Amendment violation arises from an officer-judge 
interaction, such as misrepresentations in a warrant application. It makes no 
sense to conceive of an individual officer, vis-à-vis a judge, as the state 
incarnate. In a divided state like our own, an enforcement agent’s 
willingness to perpetrate a hoax upon a judge is particularly disruptive. 
This, however, is more broadly true than just when an officer lies directly to 
a judge. It is true whenever an officer evades constitutional principle by 
ignorance or subterfuge. 
The Court’s decision in King also suggests a tolerance for pretext 
where institutional decisionmaking is concerned. This is ironic because the 
Court has insisted that a programmatic-purpose inquiry should focus on the 
state actor’s actual motivations.26 But the King Court refused to credit the 
actual reason for the state’s DNA collection policy: solving open criminal 
cases. This highlights how fundamental the outstanding questions regarding 
programmatic purpose are. It is uncertain how intensive judicial scrutiny 
should be, whether particular kinds of institutions are entitled to deference 
(for example, state legislatures versus municipal police departments), or 
how to evaluate institutions that are responsible for carrying out multiple 
 
25  See supra note 1. 
26  See Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080–81 (2011) (citing United States v. 
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 (2001)); see also City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 
45–47 (2000) (explaining the relevance of an officer’s subjective intent in the programmatic-
purpose inquiry, and rejecting the Whren rule in the context of the Indianapolis drug 
interdiction checkpoints). 
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goals that span the civil–criminal divide (of which municipal police 
departments are a prime example). 
Normatively, this Article draws on political theory to argue that Fourth 
Amendment purpose should ensure enforcement bureaucracies behave 
honestly and transparently. To do this, purpose should serve as an ex ante 
organizing principle for institutions. The Fourth Amendment should require 
the state to narrowly define specific enforcement purposes and assign 
responsibility to specific institutional actors for advancing each one. This 
should be a prerequisite for a particular institution’s agents to conduct any 
searches or seizures at all. This is in stark contrast to purpose’s current role 
as a judicial device for untangling a state actor’s motivations after she has 
already carried out a search or seizure. 
The proposal here has far-reaching consequences for the organization 
of municipal police departments. It would require the state to strip police 
departments of at least some noncriminal functions. Where impractical to 
do so, it would require rigid segregation of employees based upon function. 
As matters stand, police departments tend to have sprawling mandates that 
encompass both criminal and civil goals. This makes it difficult, if not 
impossible, for policy makers and individual officers to differentiate and 
rank distinct goals. In addition, because police departments have sprawling 
mandates that include criminal and civil goals, officers have substantial 
opportunities for pretextual searches and seizures. The incentive for 
pretextual behavior will be particularly high where a state actor is 
responsible for overlapping purposes, some of which are subject to more 
stringent procedural constraints than others. 
The DNA testing in King offers a provisional illustration of how the 
proposal might function. To the extent that King permits DNA testing of 
arrestees for administrative identification purposes,27 that function should 
be assigned to dedicated administrative personnel who are segregated from 
officers responsible for investigating crimes. Communication between the 
two categories of personnel should be limited to constitutional purposes 
only. The same principle supports stripping the police of some enforcement 
duties altogether. For example, the Fourth Amendment currently allows 
police to stop motorists at fixed roadblocks to check for sobriety.28 Officers 
need not have individualized suspicion to do so, provided that the 
roadblock’s purpose is preventing drunk driving.29 Practically speaking 
 
27  Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1971–74 (2013). 
28  See Mich. Dep’t State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990). 
29  See id. at 450–51. 
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though, police officers will advance that purpose by making arrests. In 
addition, little prevents police officers from using the roadblock as an 
opportunity to investigate crimes unrelated to drunk driving.30 This Article 
suggests that a civil entity without arrest authority, like the Department of 
Motor Vehicles, would be a more constitutionally trustworthy roadblock 
administrator. Its incentives are better aligned with the roadblock’s 
constitutionally permitted purpose: removing drunk drivers from the road. 
The Article proceeds in three sections. Section I surveys the Court’s 
pervasive reliance on the notion of purpose in Fourth Amendment cases, 
identifying the three frameworks the Court deploys: objective, subjective, 
and programmatic. Section II, the Article’s analytic heart, offers a critical 
account of the Court’s reliance on purpose in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. Section III concludes by sketching a reform proposal. 
I. PURPOSE IS UBIQUITOUS IN FOURTH AMENDMENT CASES 
There is scant literature addressing the ubiquitous references to 
purpose in Fourth Amendment opinions. What little exists tends to narrowly 
advocate for a subjective approach to evaluating individual officers’ 
intentions without recognizing the range of functions the concept serves.31 
This oversight may occur because the Court does not generally rely on 
purpose as the organizing principle for its Fourth Amendment analysis. 
Purpose analysis is embedded within the two dominant approaches to 
Fourth Amendment questions, “warrant plus exceptions” and “history plus 
reasonableness.” The first approach, inaugurated by the Warren Court in 
Katz v. United States,32 was once the preeminent approach. It required 
 
30  See infra Section III.B. 
31  See Craig M. Bradley, The Reasonable Policeman: Police Intent in Criminal 
Procedure, 76 MISS. L.J. 339, 343 (2006) (arguing against objective test of purpose); John 
M. Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70, 111 (1982) (same); George Dix, 
Subjective “Intent” as a Component of Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 76 MISS. L.J. 
373, 377 (2006) (same); Brooks Holland, The Road ‘Round Edmond: Steering Through 
Primary Purposes and Crime Control Agendas, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 293, 308 (2006) (same 
in cases involving suspicionless stops at roadblocks). In contrast this Article analyzes 
different conceptions of purpose that the Court has adopted across Fourth Amendment 
contexts. There is a growing literature regarding the role of “intention” in criminal 
procedure, but these scholars do not generally address the Fourth Amendment. This is likely 
because the Fourth Amendment is not limited to “criminal” cases. See infra Sections I.A–B. 
See, e.g., Susan R. Klein, Redrawing the Criminal-Civil Boundary, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 
679, 720–21 (1999); Alice Ristroph, State Intentions and the Law of Punishment, 98 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1353, 1354–57 (2008); Issachar Rosen-Zvi & Talia Fisher, Overcoming 
Procedural Boundaries, 94 VA. L. REV. 79, 126–29 (2008). 
32  389 U.S. 347 (1967). This is the framework for how at least one leading textbook 
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courts to decide whether police have obtained a warrant before searching, or 
acted pursuant to a judicially specified exception to that requirement.33 In 
recent decades, the Court has increasingly embraced a second approach. It 
requires courts to determine what common law practice was when the 
Fourth Amendment was drafted and, where unclear, to use open-ended 
interest balancing to assess Fourth Amendment claims.34 Scholarly critiques 
of these two different frameworks are legion,35 but overlook what the two 
approaches share: an attention to state actors’ purpose. The Court’s analysis 
of purpose cuts across the two dominant approaches to the Fourth 
Amendment. 
The background discussion below shows that the Supreme Court has 
failed to develop a consistent framework for analyzing purpose in Fourth 
Amendment cases. As detailed in Section A, in cases involving individual 
state agents, the Court usually insists that analysis of purpose is objective, 
but fails to account for what that means. There are rare occasions identified 
in Section B where the Court permits subjective analysis of officer purpose. 
Section C surveys the so-called administrative and special needs cases 
where the Court has embraced an altogether different approach to purpose, 
which it describes as programmatic. The Court has repeatedly stated that 
this requires evaluation of a state actor’s actual motivations.36 But the Court 
has not been consistent in heeding its own words.37 
 
teaches the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., RONALD ALLEN, ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE xiv–xvi (3d ed. 2011) (beginning with Katz and following with exceptions). 
33  See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. 
34  Justice Scalia has, quite successfully, spearheaded this common-law driven approach. 
See, e.g., David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1739, 1748–61 (2000) (describing the approach). 
35  See, e.g., id.; Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Character of Law-and-Order 
Originalism: A Case Study of the Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine 
Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239, 246 (2002); Kathryn R. Urbonya, 
Rhetorically Reasonable Police Practices: Viewing the Supreme Court’s Multiple Discourse 
Paths, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1387, 1390 (2003). This scholarship tends to assail the 
jurisprudence for being too ad hoc, see, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First 
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 758–60 (1994); Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael 
Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 29–30 (1988), 
and for inadequately protecting individual rights, see, e.g., Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, 
Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1456, 1522 
(1996) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment should protect against targeting harm); Eve 
Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 254, 278–79 
(2011) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment allows police too much latitude in 
administrative searches). 
36  See Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080–81 (2011) (citing United States v. 
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 (2001)); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 46–47 
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A. ANALYSIS OF OFFICER PURPOSE IS USUALLY OBJECTIVE 
In Fourth Amendment cases, the Court usually insists that officer 
purpose be evaluated from an objective perspective. When explanation is 
offered for this at all,38 it is thin, hinging on the plain meaning of the word 
reasonable in the Fourth Amendment’s text or the supposed evidentiary 
difficulties that subjective analysis entails.39 
1. Individualized Suspicion Requires Objective Analysis of  
Officers’ Purpose 
In Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, individualized suspicion is the 
paradigmatic purpose inquiry.40 It requires that an officer have either 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion before searching or seizing.41 
Probable cause exists when the observable facts suggest “a fair probability 
that . . . evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”42 It takes 
fewer and less incriminating facts to generate reasonable suspicion.43 
Because probable cause is more stringent, it also permits a farther-reaching 
search than does reasonable suspicion. When an officer lawfully searches 
pursuant to probable cause, her search may extend as far as reasonably 
necessary to locate the evidence for which she has probable cause.44 An 
officer acting pursuant to reasonable suspicion, however, may only conduct 
a brief investigative interview and a limited “pat down” for weapons.45 
The individualized suspicion requirement generates a series of puzzles 
about officer error and duplicity.46 An officer might search based on the 
subjective belief that the observed facts give rise to individualized suspicion 
 
(2000). 
37  See infra Section II.B.3. 
38  See, e.g., Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1859 (2011) (stating that the Court has 
consistently rejected the subjective approach, but without explanation for why). 
39  See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814–15 (1996). 
40  Cf. Maryland v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 306–07 (1967) (suggesting that probable 
cause ensures that there is a sufficient nexus between a piece of evidence and the 
government’s “purpose of proving crime”). Although exceptions have proliferated, the Court 
still describes individualized suspicion as a touchstone for a legitimate search or seizure. See 
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37. 
41  See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 548, 654–55, 655 n.11 (1979). 
42  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 214 (1983). 
43  Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990). 
44  See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820–21 (1982) (discussing search of an 
automobile). 
45  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29–30 (1968). 
46  See Dix, supra note 31, at 441–44. 
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when they actually do not. Alternatively, an officer might search believing 
that the observable facts do not give rise to individualized suspicion when 
they actually do. Parallel questions exist as to the applicable criminal law. 
An officer might search believing that one criminal law has been violated 
when, in fact, it is actually some other. Alternatively, an officer might 
search despite her belief that no criminal law had been violated when one 
actually had been. 
The Court’s one-word solution to these puzzles has been “objective.” 
A search or seizure is lawful provided that the objectively observable facts 
give rise to individualized suspicion.47 Generally, a search that could not 
have occurred absent the investigating officer’s error is unconstitutional, 
while a search that could have occurred absent the error is constitutional.48 
An officer’s subjective belief that there was individualized suspicion will 
not make a search valid if she was objectively wrong.49 By the same token, 
if the objectively observable facts supported individualized suspicion, it 
does not matter that the investigating officer searched without subjectively 
believing that there was individualized suspicion.50 Parallel principles apply 
to officers’ legal conclusions. If the objectively observable facts suggested 
that a suspect violated a criminal law, it does not matter that the law was 
not the one that the investigating officer actually thought the suspect 
violated.51 
That a search or seizure, objectively speaking, could have occurred 
under some criminal law does not mean that it, empirically speaking, would 
have occurred. The gap between theoretical and empirical is potentially 
vast, given police officers’ broad discretion not to enforce criminal laws. 
Officers routinely overlook criminal law violations.52 That a reasonable 
 
47  See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814–15 (1996). 
48  See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 3.2(b) (5th ed. 2012) (discussing United 
States ex rel. Senk v. Brierley, 381 F. Supp. 447 (M.D. Pa 1974), United States v. Day, 455 
F.2d 454 (3d Cir. 1972), and Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983)). 
49  Cf. id. (discussing, in the context of Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964), that an 
officer’s good faith, subjective belief that he had grounds to make an arrest is insufficient to 
support an otherwise improper arrest). 
50  See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 507 (1983) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he fact that 
the officers did not believe there was probable cause and proceeded on a consensual or 
Terry-stop rationale would not foreclose the State from justifying Royer's custody by 
proving probable cause and hence removing any barrier to relying on Royer's consent to 
search.”); Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 802–05 (1971) (holding that the police arrested 
the wrong individual, but that the mistake was reasonable). 
51  See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153–54 (2004). 
52  See Nirej Sekhon, Redistributive Policing, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171, 
1175–77 (2011). 
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officer could have permissibly searched or seized does not mean that she 
would actually have done so. In Atwater v. Lago Vista, the Court held that 
an arrest characterized by “gratuitous humiliations” does not violate the 
Fourth Amendment so long as it is supported by probable cause.53 In 
Atwater, a police officer arrested a “soccer mom” for a seatbelt violation.54 
Atwater argued that the officer behaved unreasonably even though the 
officer had probable cause to arrest.55 While the Court agreed that the 
officer exercised “extremely poor judgment,”56 it refused to look beyond 
whether his conduct was supported by probable cause—which it was.57 
An objective approach is also problematic because it creates 
considerable latitude for officers to behave pretextually.58 In Whren v. 
United States, undercover narcotics officers pulled Whren over for a traffic 
violation and subsequently found narcotics.59 Whren, who was black, 
conceded that he had violated a traffic law.60 However, he argued that the 
stop would not have occurred absent the investigating officers’ ulterior 
motive: to find drugs.61 Whren further argued that the investigating officer 
impermissibly relied upon Whren’s race to predict the presence of narcotics 
in his car.62 A police department regulation limited when undercover 
officers were supposed to make traffic stops.63 Whren argued that a 
reasonable undercover officer would not have violated the regulation and 
pulled Whren over for a traffic violation.64 The Court refused to consider 
what a reasonable officer would have done in the same circumstance, 
derisively casting it as a subjective inquiry into the investigating officer’s 
motives, a task fraught with metaphysical uncertainty and evidentiary 
peril.65 
 
53  532 U.S. 318, 347, 354 (2001). 
54  Id. at 323–24. 
55  Id. at 346–47. 
56  Id. at 346–50. 
57  Id. at 354. 
58  See LAFAVE, supra note 48, at § 1.4(f) (discussing pretext and Whren v. United 
States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)); see also id. at § 3.2(b) (discussing problems associated with 
pretext in the context of police authority and discretion, broadly, and with regard to 
subjective intentions and Whren). 
59  517 U.S. 806, 808–09 (1996). 
60  Id. at 810. 
61  Id. at 809. 
62  Id. at 810. 
63  Id. at 815. 
64  Id. at 816–17. 
65  Rather, the Court simply dismissed the entire question calling it an exercise in “virtual 
subjectivity.” Id. at 814–15. 
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Together, Whren and Atwater mark the triumph of theoretical over 
empirical—could over would. The Court will assume that a police officer 
was motivated by individualized suspicion whenever theoretically possible 
that an officer in her position could have been. 
2. Objective Purpose Is Increasingly Central to Determining if a  
Search Occurred 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Jardines66 suggests that 
purpose will play a more significant role in determining whether the Fourth 
Amendment applies at all. The Fourth Amendment only restrains conduct 
that is defined as a search or seizure.67 The Court has defined the standard 
for whether a seizure occurred in terms of officer purpose.68 In Brower v. 
Inyo, the Court concluded that a seizure occurs when the police 
“intentionally appl[y]” force to subdue a suspect.69 The inquiry is 
objective.70 
In Katz, the Court held that a search occurs when an officer intrudes 
upon a privacy interest that that society is prepared to recognize as 
reasonable.71 As Professor Amsterdam recognized forty years ago, this 
ostensibly populist conceptualization does not readily translate into an 
administrable doctrinal test.72 Commentators have rightly criticized the 
resultant search jurisprudence as ad hoc and unprincipled.73 Justices have 
previously hinted that analyzing officer purpose could play a role in making 
search jurisprudence more consistent and rigorous.74 In Jardines, the Court 
appeared to require just such an inquiry.75 In Jones v. United States, when it 
concluded that the installation of a GPS device was a search, Justice Scalia 
hinted that officer purpose will play a central role in this new approach.76 In 
Jardines, he gave fuller expression to that notion. 
 
66  133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013). 
67  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
68  See Brower v. Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989). 
69  Id. The test for whether a seizure occurred varies with context. See, e.g., United States 
v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201 (2002) (“If a reasonable person would feel free to terminate 
the encounter, then he or she has not been seized.”). 
70  Brower, 489 U.S. at 597. 
71  389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). 
72  Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 
349, 386 (1974) (discussing “the problems of formulating such a basic conception”). 
73  See supra note 35. 
74  See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 341–42 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
75  Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1416 (2013). 
76  132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (“The Government physically occupied private property 
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In Jardines, a police officer used Franky, a narcotics-sniffing dog to 
confirm an unverified tip that Jardines was growing marijuana in his 
home.77 Without having obtained a warrant, the officer approached 
Jardines’ home with Franky.78 Franky sniffed the front door and “alerted.”79 
The officer then obtained a warrant to search Jardines’s home.80 It turned 
out that Franky had been correct.81 Jardines moved to suppress the 
marijuana evidence, arguing that the officer’s use of Franky on the doorstep 
was a search that required a warrant.82 
The Court focused on the officer’s purpose in approaching Jardines’s 
home.83 The Court has increasingly relied upon property law concepts in 
analyzing whether a search occurred.84 Writing for the majority in Jardines, 
Justice Scalia noted that under the Fourth Amendment, the home “is first 
among equals.”85 This was based on the Founding Era understanding that 
“property of every man [is] so sacred, that no man can set his foot upon his 
neighbor’s property without leave.”86 “Leave” may be inferred from 
national custom-that is, Girl Scouts and trick-or-treaters typically have a 
license to approach one’s front door.87 That license, however, is “limited 
not only to a particular area, but also to a specific purpose.”88 According to 
the Court, it does not extend to those whose purpose is to conduct a 
search.89 The Court in Jardines, however, took pains to qualify that its 
purpose inquiry was objective. It stated that the officer’s conduct was a 
search because it “objectively reveal[ed] a purpose to conduct a search, 
which is not what anyone would think he had license to do.”90 But it is 
unclear what this means. In dissent, Justice Alito speculated that it might 
 
for the purpose of obtaining information.”). 
77  133 S. Ct. at 1413. 
78  Id. 
79  Id. 
80  Id. 
81  Id. 
82  Id. 
83  Id. at 1416–17. 
84  See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949–50 (2012) (invoking English 
common law principles). 
85  Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414. 
86  Id. at 1415 (citing 2 Wils. K.B. 275, 291, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817). However, this is not 
based on any specific principle of trespass. See id. at 1423 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
87  Id. at 1415. 
88  Id. at 1416. 
89  Id. 
90  Id. at 1417. 
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mean that objective facts reveal the officer’s subjective purpose.91 This, 
however, is just a subjective test—whenever a court is asked to determine 
an actor’s subjective mental state, it must answer based upon the objective 
facts that are part of the record. 
3. Many Exceptions Turn on Objective Purpose 
Although the Court has stated that a warrant based upon probable 
cause is a prerequisite for any search or seizure,92 exceptions abound.93 
When one of these exceptions turns on officer purpose, the Court has 
generally embraced an objective approach, meaning that officers’ ulterior 
motives are of no constitutional consequence. If a reasonable officer could 
have availed herself of the exception, then it does not matter that an actual 
officer did so with an ulterior motive that would have been unconstitutional 
standing alone. Four examples follow: exigency, plain view, third-party 
consent, and inevitable discovery. 
In its most recent exigency case, King, the Court expressly disavowed 
subjective purpose analysis.94 The exigency exception permits police 
officers to conduct a warrantless search or seizure where there is probable 
cause and an exigency that makes it impracticable to obtain a warrant—for 
example, when there is a fleeing suspect.95 In King, the Court considered 
whether the exception applies when officers themselves create the 
exigency.96 The officers knocked on a suspected drug dealer’s door and, “as 
loud as [they] could,” yelled, “This is the police” or “Police, police, police,” 
inducing the suspects to begin destroying evidence.97 Relying on objective 
analysis, the Court held that whether the police deliberately or negligently 
induced the destruction of evidence does not matter so long as they “d[id] 
not gain entry to premises by means of an actual or threatened violation of 
the Fourth Amendment.”98 
 
91  See id. at 1423–24 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
92  See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
93  See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582–83 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(surveying examples). 
94  563 U.S. 452, 464 (2011) (“‘Our cases have repeatedly rejected’ a subjective 
approach, asking only whether ‘the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the action.’” 
(quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006))). 
95  See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1967). 
96  563 U.S. at 455. 
97  Id. at 456. 
98  Id. at 469 (finding no such violation because, as with a private citizen who knocks at 
the door, occupants have no obligation to open the door for a police officer who knocks 
without a warrant). 
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In Brigham City v. Stuart, the Court held that exigency also permits a 
warrantless search of a home when it is reasonable to think that someone 
inside is in danger of imminent injury.99 In such a situation, the officer’s 
purpose is ostensibly to provide aid, not to make arrests. The officers in 
Stuart had responded to a call regarding a loud house party; upon arriving, 
they observed a fight and intervened.100 The state court had held that the 
exception does not apply if the officers subjectively intended to make 
arrests.101 The Supreme Court rejected that approach, holding that a search 
is constitutional if objective circumstances justify it.102 Echoing Whren, the 
Court emphasized that the Fourth Amendment forbids only objectively 
unreasonable searches without regard for the investigating officer’s actual, 
subjective plan.103 
The Court similarly refused to allow consideration of officers’ 
subjective motivations when claiming the plain view exception.104 This 
exception permits an officer to seize evidence without a warrant if its 
relevance to a crime is immediately apparent and she happens upon it while 
lawfully present in the location.105 For example, if an officer happens upon 
illegal narcotics while conducting a warrant search for illegal firearms in a 
private home, she could seize the narcotics under the plain view exception. 
Until the Court decided Horton v. California,106 many thought that officers 
had to unwittingly come upon evidence of crime to claim the plain view 
exception.107 In Horton, the Court held otherwise.108 The officer applied for 
a warrant to search a home for the proceeds from a recent robbery in 
addition to the firearms used by the suspects.109 The magistrate, however, 
issued a warrant for the robbery’s proceeds only, not the weapons.110 While 
executing that warrant, the officer discovered the weapons, not the 
proceeds.111 The Court held that seizing the weapons was permissible under 
 
99  547 U.S. 398, 406–07 (2005). 
100  Id. at 401. 
101  Id. at 404. 
102  Id. 
103  See id. at 404–05. 
104  See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990). 
105  Id. at 134–36. 
106  496 U.S. 128. 
107  Justice Stewart suggested as much in Coolidge, albeit in a portion of the opinion that 
failed to garner the majority. See 403 U.S. at 469–71. 
108  496 U.S. at 130, 142. 
109  Id. at 130–31. 
110  Id. at 131. 
111  Id. 
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the plain view exception.112 In rejecting that such discovery must be 
inadvertent, the Court invoked its mantra that “objective standards of 
conduct” better achieve “evenhanded law enforcement” than do subjective 
standards.113 
As in Whren and Stuart, Horton deems an officer’s ulterior motive 
irrelevant. In Horton, it may have been an accident that the search warrant 
failed to mention the weapons that the officer expected to discover—and 
did ultimately discover.114 The opinion, however, does not recognize the 
possibility that an officer might use the plain view exception instrumentally. 
If an officer has a hunch, but not probable cause, that there is evidence 
somewhere, she will have incentive to conduct a lawful search on whatever 
basis she can muster. Plain view will permit her to seize the evidence she 
actually sought (assuming her hunch was correct) even if the search would 
never have occurred absent her ulterior motive. 
The gap separating empirical from theoretical is apparent in the so-
called third-party consent doctrine as well. Third-party consent is a species 
of consent search that requires neither warrant nor probable cause.115 When 
an individual agrees to permit a search, the police may conduct one. The 
Court, however, has interpreted “voluntariness” with unusual generosity to 
the police.116 Officers may obtain consent from a third-party who only 
appears to have the authority to permit a search.117 In Illinois v. Rodriguez, 
the police searched the defendant’s apartment relying upon his girlfriend’s 
consent when she had no actual authority to provide it.118 The Court held 
that the search was permissible provided that a reasonable officer would 
have concluded that the consenter had authority to permit the search.119 
The Court has also used objective analysis to limit the exclusionary 
rule’s application. The exclusionary rule requires that courts exclude 
evidence obtained as a result of a Fourth Amendment violation.120 This 
means that guilty defendants will go free because the “constable has 
 
112  See id. at 130. The Court also noted that inadvertence would not protect privacy 
because, for the plain view exception to apply, the officer must already be conducting a 
lawful search. Id. at 141–42. 
113  Id. at 138. 
114  See id. at 131, 138 n.9. 
115  See Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1136–37 (2013). 
116  For example, police officers’ failure to inform an individual of her right to refuse a 
search does not vitiate that individual’s consent to said search. See, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 
519 U.S. 33, 39–40 (1996). 
117  See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 180, 187–89 (1990). 
118  Id. at 179–80. 
119  Id. at 188. 
120  See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485–87 (1963). 
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blundered.”121 Objective purpose analysis also ensures that the state is not 
unduly punished for an investigating officer’s idiosyncratic perception error 
when another officer could have lawfully carried out the same search or 
seizure.122 In the same vein, the Court has created a host of exceptions to 
the exclusionary rule. For example, inevitable discovery exempts evidence 
that the police would have ultimately discovered absent the constitutional 
violation.123 This species of harmless error is supposed to ensure that the 
state is not left worse off than it would have been absent a constitutional 
violation.124 For example, the defendant in Nix v. Williams divulged the 
location of his victim’s body in response to unconstitutional questioning by 
the police.125 In the meantime, the police had been coordinating a search for 
the victim’s body. After the confession resulted in the recovery of the body, 
the trial court concluded that the searchers eventually would have 
discovered the body and refused to exclude the evidence.126 The Court 
decided that there should be no inquiry into the whether the constitutional 
violation was in bad faith. It curtly stated that it was implausible that 
officers would ever take “dubious ‘shortcuts’” to obtain evidence that could 
be obtained lawfully, or even be able to calculate the likelihood that 
evidence would be discovered.127 
B. SUBJECTIVE ANALYSIS IS OCCASIONALLY PERMITTED 
Now and then, the Court seems willing to scrutinize officers’ 
subjective motivations in connection with untruthful warrant applications. 
For example, in Franks, the defendant challenged the affidavit supporting a 
warrant application.128 In the application, the officer attested to interviewing 
specific witnesses who confirmed that Franks’s typical work attire precisely 
matched that of a rape suspect.129 The officer, however, had lied about 
speaking with witnesses.130 The Court held that the exclusionary rule 
applies if an officer was reckless or deliberately untruthful about material 
 
121  People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926).  Justice (then Judge) Cardozo’s 
words remain a pithy statement of the exclusionary rule’s social cost.  
122  See LAFAVE, supra note 48, at § 1.4(e). 
123  See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S 431, 444 (1984). 
124  See id. at 443–44. 
125  Id. at 436–37. 
126  Id. at 437–38. 
127  Id. at 445–46. 
128  438 U.S. 154, 155–56 (1978). 
129  Id. at 157. 
130  See id. at 158. 
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facts in a warrant application.131 The Court emphasized that it sought to 
preserve the integrity of the magistrate’s function.132 Because warrant 
applications are ex parte, even a conscientious magistrate could miss 
deliberate or reckless untruths.133 
In both United States v. Leon and Murray v. United States, the Court 
reiterated that officers must be subjectively honest when seeking warrants. 
In Leon, the Court approved the good-faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule.134 Where an officer relies in good faith upon a warrant that is later 
determined not to have been supported by probable cause, the exclusionary 
rule does not apply—evidence seized pursuant to the faulty warrant remains 
admissible.135 While the Court emphasized that good faith is an objective 
inquiry, it reaffirmed Franks.136 The Court noted that an officer cannot have 
acted in good faith if she was reckless or deliberately untruthful in her 
warrant application.137 
In Murray, the Court implied that subjective inquiry was necessary to 
ascertain the purity of an officer’s choice to apply for a warrant.138 In 
Murray, officers suspected that a large quantity of narcotics was being 
stored in a warehouse.139 The officers confirmed their suspicion by illegally 
entering the warehouse and observing narcotics.140 Only afterward did the 
officers seek and receive a warrant to search the warehouse.141 The officers 
did not mention the illegal search that had preceded their application.142 The 
magistrate issued a warrant based on the information that the officers had 
accumulated independent of the unlawful earlier search.143 The government 
argued against exclusion because the warrant would have issued whether 
the illegal search had occurred or not.144 Suppressing the evidence would 
 
131  Id. at 171–72. If the officer lies in the affidavit, and what is left of the warrant 
application after the false information is removed still sustains the conclusion that there was 
probable cause for the search, then the warrant’s fruits need not be suppressed. Id. at 172 n.8. 
132  See id. at 168–69. 
133  See id.; see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984) (providing “that the 
deference accorded to a magistrate's finding of probable cause does not preclude inquiry into 
the knowing or reckless falsity of the affidavit on which that determination was based”). 
134  Leon, 468 U.S. at 913, 922. 
135  See id. at 919–22. 
136  See id. at 922–23. 
137  Id. at 926. 
138  Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 535 (1988). 
139  Id. 
140  Id. 
141  Id. at 535–36. 
142  Id. at 543. 
143  Id. at 542–43. 
144  The so-called independent source exception to the exclusionary rule is animated by 
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accordingly have left the government in a worse position than it would have 
been had the illegal search not occurred.145 Although the Court accepted 
this argument, it asked whether the search pursuant to the warrant “was in 
fact a genuinely independent source” of the evidence seized.146 The Court 
remanded for fact finding as to whether “the agents would have sought a 
warrant if they had not earlier entered the warehouse.”147 That is tantamount 
to asking what the agents’ purpose was in first entering the warehouse.148 
There is no suggestion that this was—or could be—anything other than a 
subjective inquiry into the agents’ motivations. 
The Court has also expressly conditioned constitutionality upon 
officers’ good faith in so-called inventory searches.149 Officers may conduct 
an inventory search of an impounded automobile without a warrant or even 
probable cause.150 An inventory search allows police to identify the contents 
of such vehicles in order to protect owners against theft, protect the police 
against claims of theft, and ensure police safety.151 The Court has repeatedly 
approved inventory searches, but only on the condition that the police 
department has standardized regulations governing their execution.152 The 
Court has cautioned against pretextual use of inventory searches to 
investigate crimes for which the officers do not have probable cause.153 The 
Court, however, has muddled this invitation to engage in subjective inquiry. 
In Stuart, the Court cast inventory search cases as permitting scrutiny of 
programmatic purpose only, not officer motive.154 This invites the question 
of how the two differ. 
C. ADMINISTRATIVE AND OTHER SPECIAL NEEDS 
In evaluating so-called administrative and special needs searches, the 
Court has developed an entirely different framework for evaluating purpose 
 
the same logic as the “inevitable discovery” exception discussed above. See id. at 537 (citing 
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984)). 
145  See id. at 537. 
146  Id. at 542. 
147  Id. at 543. 
148  The agents had argued that their purpose in entering the warehouse without a warrant 
was to ensure that no evidence was destroyed while they obtained a warrant. Id. The district 
court acknowledged this but did not make a specific factual finding as to independent source. 
Id. 
149  Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374 (1987). 
150  Id. at 375–76. 
151  Id. at 373–74. 
152  See Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1990). 
153  See Bertine, 479 U.S. at 376–77 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
154  547 U.S. 398, 405 (2006). 
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than in the cases described above. The Court has called it “programmatic 
purpose.”155 While the typical Fourth Amendment case involves a police 
officer enforcing a criminal law, the state often searches and seizes to 
advance noncriminal, regulatory interests—for example, enforcing the 
building code,156 supervising state employees,157 enforcing rules at public 
schools,158 and inspecting businesses that impact public health.159 In these 
cases the Court balances the state’s programmatic purpose—provided that it 
is not to investigate ordinary crime—for carrying out searches or seizures 
against the individual intrusions that such conduct entails.160 The Court’s 
recent decision in King,161 however, highlights the foundational questions 
that remain unanswered with regard to programmatic-purpose analysis.162 
First, whether the Fourth Amendment requires courts to evaluate a state 
actor’s actual purposes, or whether hypothetical purposes might suffice.163 
Second, whether courts must differentiate an actor’s primary purposes from 
secondary and tertiary purposes, and if so, by what method.164 
To understand why the Court takes a different approach to purpose in 
the administrative and special needs contexts, one must understand the 
history that has given rise to the patchwork of exceptions. It was not long 
into the Warren Court’s expansion of criminal procedure rights that it 
confronted a noncriminal regulatory search. In Camara v. City of San 
Francisco,165 the Warren Court decided that a housing inspector need not 
demonstrate individualized suspicion to obtain a warrant for an 
administrative search to ensure building code compliance.166 While 
breaking from precedent that had held no warrant was required,167 Camara 
held that a warrant could issue upon a showing that the state had a 
 
155  City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 45 (2000). 
156  Camara v. San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
157  California v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010). 
158  New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
159  See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981). 
160  See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41–42, 44 (2000). 
161  133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013). 
162  See infra notes 202–213 and accompanying text. 
163  See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080–81 (2011); see also Chandler v. 
Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 319 (1997) (“Nothing in the record hints that the hazards respondents 
broadly describe are real and not simply hypothetical for Georgia's polity.”). 
164  See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 82–84 (2001) (distinguishing 
a drug test program’s primary purpose from its secondary purpose). 
165  387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
166  Id. at 538–39. 
167  See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 372–73 (1959) (holding that there is no 
warrant required for search by health inspector). 
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reasonable basis for carrying out inspections in a particular area.168 When a 
search target is part of an industry that is pervasively regulated—which 
diminishes operators’ expectations of privacy—it may be subject to 
administrative inspection without warrant.169 In Burger v. New York, for 
example, the Court permitted a warrantless inspection of an auto yard 
pursuant to New York State’s administrative scheme designed to prevent 
auto thefts.170 
The special needs exception evolved from the administrative search 
cases.171 In New Jersey v. T.L.O., the Court held a principal’s warrantless 
search of a public high school student’s purse for cigarettes did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment.172 The Court’s reasonableness scale tipped toward 
the school’s interest in maintaining order and away from the student’s 
privacy interest.173 The Court subsequently expanded the special needs 
exception to include “dragnet” type searches.174 For example, the Court has 
permitted suspicionless searches at fixed roadblocks that are for the primary 
programmatic purpose of stemming “the flow of illegal entrants” into the 
United States,175 “preventing drunken driving,”176 or identifying evidence of 
a recent crime.177 
Until recently, it was reasonable to think that a legitimate “special 
need” arose only when the state was trying to solve an empirically 
demonstrated problem. In Vernonia School District v. Acton, the Court 
upheld random, suspicionless drug testing of student athletes.178 In Acton, 
the Court credited the school district’s showing that there was an actual 
drug problem in the district, particularly among student athletes.179 In 
 
168  Camara, 387 U.S. at 538–39. 
169  See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987). 
170  Id. at 718. 
171  The early special needs cases explicitly rely on Camara. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 
469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985); Primus, supra note 35, at 275–76. The expression “special needs” 
was first used in a Supreme Court opinion by Justice Blackmun in concurrence in T.L.O., 
469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
172  469 U.S. at 328. 
173  Id. at 339–40. 
174  Dragnet searches are those “searches or seizures of every person, place, or thing in a 
specific location or involved in a specific activity.” Primus, supra note 35, at 260. Professor 
Primus argues that the Court should not have expanded the special needs exception to 
include dragnet searches. See id. at 259–60, 309–10. 
175  United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 552 (1976). 
176  Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990). 
177  Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 423 (2004). 
178  515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
179  Id. at 663. 
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Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n,180 a federal agency 
successfully demonstrated that drug and alcohol testing was necessary to 
respond to railroad accidents.181 The regulations were promulgated based 
upon evidence of property damage and fatalities that alcohol and drug-
impaired railroad employees were involved in.182 These interests 
outweighed individual workers’ interest in privacy, particularly given that 
the relevant regulations controlled agency discretion.183 
In contrast to Acton and Skinner, in Chandler v. Miller the Court 
concluded that Georgia’s interest in requiring drug and alcohol testing of 
candidates running for office was not a special need.184 Georgia argued that 
drug use could hamper elected officials’ job performance and undermine 
public confidence in them.185 However, there was nothing in the record to 
suggest that this had actually happened.186 Accordingly, the Court rejected 
these arguments because they did not amount to a showing of “concrete 
danger,” but rather were merely “hypothetical.”187 
Not only has the Court suggested that the special needs exception 
demands an actual problem but also it has noted that the problem cannot be 
one of “ordinary crime control.”188 Without these requirements, the Court 
was concerned that state actors would pretextually circumvent the 
individualized suspicion and warrant requirements that apply in criminal 
cases. For example, in both Acton and Von Raab, the Court seemed to give 
significant weight to the fact that the suspicionless drug testing protocols 
prohibited positive tests from being divulged to law enforcement.189 In 
Skinner, there was no express prohibition on divulging positive test results 
to law enforcement, but there was no suggestion of pretextual drug testing 
 
180  489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
181  Id. at 609–10. 
182  Id. at 608. 
183  Id. at 624. 
184  520 U.S. 305, 321–22 (1997). 
185  Id. at 318. 
186  Id. at 321. 
187  Id. at 319. But see Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). In 
Von Raab, the Court permitted suspicionless drug testing of Customs officials who carried 
firearms and worked with narcotics based upon hypothetical security and danger-related 
problems. Id. at 669–71. The Court, however, rationalized this by underscoring the agency’s 
“unique mission” as the “first line of defense” against narcotics smuggling. Id. at 668, 674. 
This did not mollify Justice Scalia who contended that an empirically demonstrable problem 
was necessary for a special needs search. Id. at 683–84 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
188  See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000). 
189  See Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 
663, 666. 
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to obtain convictions.190 Transferring evidence generated by a suspicionless 
search to law enforcement sometimes provides good evidence of 
unconstitutional pretext.191 For example, in Ferguson v. Charleston, a 
public hospital tested maternity patients for cocaine use and the evidence 
was turned over to prosecutors pursuant to official protocol.192 The Court 
held the drug testing unconstitutional, rejecting the argument that it was 
justified by the special need of protecting mothers’ and babies’ health.193 
The police’s integral role in administering the testing program suggested 
that its purpose was simply criminal law enforcement.194 
The rule that ordinary crime control is not a special need presents 
unique difficulty for police departments because crime control will always 
be a background purpose.195 The Court nonetheless permits police 
departments to conduct suspicionless searches under the special needs 
exception.196 The Court requires that the primary programmatic purpose not 
be crime control, but the secondary purpose can be.197 This means that 
courts may treat similar instances of police conduct differently depending 
on the motives underlying each instance.198 The Court has elaborated on the 
primary–secondary distinction by casting the former as an “immediate 
objective” and the latter as an “ultimate goal.”199 In Ferguson, the Court 
acknowledged that the “ultimate” purpose of the maternity drug-testing 
program may have been addiction remediation, but the “immediate” goal 
was generating evidence of criminal misdeed.200 But this distinction is not 
easily reconciled with other special needs cases involving police 
departments. For example, in the roadblock cases, the immediate means 
available to the police for advancing the ultimate goals of “interdicting the 
flow of illegal entrants from Mexico” and eradicating “the drunken driving 
problem” were enforcing criminal prohibitions.201 
 
190  Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 621 n.5 (1989). 
191  See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 80–81 (2000). 
192  Id. at 71–73. 
193  Id. at 81. 
194  See id. at 82–83. 
195  See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 46–47 (2000) (noting the 
“challenges inherent in a purpose inquiry”). 
196  See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 428 (2003), Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 
496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990). 
197  See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 82–84 (2001). 
198  See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 46–47. 
199  E.g., Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 82–84. 
200  Id. at 82–83. 
201  Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990); United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 552 (1976). 
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King calls into question whether special needs requires an empirically 
demonstrable problem at all.202 It also underscores the difficulty of 
distinguishing primary from secondary purposes. In King, the Court 
approved Maryland’s collection of DNA samples from arrestees based upon 
the program’s secondary (maybe even tertiary) purpose rather than its most 
obvious primary purpose. Maryland authorizes law enforcement agencies to 
collect DNA samples from arrestees accused of certain violent felonies for 
inclusion in the State’s DNA database.203 After arresting King for assault, 
the police took a DNA sample from him. When compared to other samples 
in the database, King’s DNA profile matched the DNA evidence collected 
in an unsolved rape case.204 King challenged the DNA evidence’s admission 
in the rape case against him because there was no probable cause to collect 
the DNA.205 Had the State’s purpose been solving past crimes, the 
individualized suspicion and warrant requirements would have applied.206 
The Court, however, analyzed the DNA collection program using the same 
species of reasonableness balancing used in the special needs cases.207 In 
concluding that the balance of interests tipped in the government’s favor, 
the Court credited the government’s interest in “proper[ly] processing . . . 
arrestees.”208 That requires properly identifying arrestees which, in turn, 
may facilitate an accurate determination of whether the individual is a flight 
risk or poses danger to the community if released.209 
The King Court paid scant attention to the program’s primary purpose 
of investigating crime even though it was identified in the preface of the 
law itself.210 Writing for four dissenting justices, Justice Scalia chided the 
majority for paying no attention to the Maryland Legislature’s express 
statement of purpose.211 In addition, the Maryland law forbade police from 
testing arrestees’ DNA until first appearance, casting significant doubt on 
 
202  See 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969–70 (2013). 
203  Id. at 1967. 
204  Id. at 1966. 
205  Id. 
206  See id. at 1981–82 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
207  Id. at 1981–82, 1982 n.1. The majority denied that it applied the special needs 
exception, stating that the exception “d[id] not have a direct bearing on the issues 
presented . . . because unlike the search of a citizen who has not been suspected of a wrong, 
a detainee has a reduced expectation of privacy.” Id. at 1978 (majority opinion). The Court 
offered no support for the claim but, strangely, stated that the case’s outcome was supported 
by the special needs cases. See id.   
208  Id. at 1974. 
209  Id. at 1972–73. 
210  See id. at 1985 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
211  See id. at 1984. 
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the majority’s suggestion that the legislature’s purpose was to facilitate 
accurate identification and processing of arrestees.212 This is inconsistent 
with the Court’s suggestion in earlier opinions that programmatic purpose 
requires evaluation of the state’s actual reasons for carrying out searches.213 
King highlights the confusion as to what programmatic-purpose 
analysis requires, let alone how it relates to the notions of objective and 
subjective purpose analysis that the Court has used in other Fourth 
Amendment contexts.214 
II. STATE PURPOSE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
Having demonstrated the ubiquity and inconsistent application of 
purpose in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, this Section advances a 
critical, descriptive account of the concept. It also explains the functions 
that concept serves and why the Court has failed to fully develop it. 
Section A demonstrates that despite that objective purpose has the 
trappings of state-of-mind analysis in criminal law or torts, it ultimately 
functions as a rhetorical device for imputing the state’s corporate 
intentionality to individual officers. Objective purpose seems analogous to 
state of mind only because the typical Fourth Amendment challenge arises 
as an incident to an individual criminal case. This implicitly casts the 
constitutional dispute as one between two individuals, an officer and a 
suspect. But a police officer is not an ordinary individual. The Court’s 
insistence that its analysis of purpose is objective reflects the officer’s status 
as state agent. Section B shows that when evaluating institutional behavior 
in special needs and administrative exception cases the Court uses 
programmatic purpose as shorthand for constitutional means-ends testing. 
The Court refuses to expressly draw the analogy, ensuring that 
programmatic purpose remains much more schematic than means-ends 
testing in other areas of constitutional law. The discussion below 
demonstrates that this is because the Court is unable to identify whether 
criminal enforcement is an end or a means. Thus, it is not only unclear what 
programmatic purpose requires of institutional policy-making, but also 
unclear what it requires of the relationship between an institution and its 
agents in the field. A fully developed framework for addressing the latter 
 
212  See id. at 1983. 
213  See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080–81 (2011); see also Chandler v. 
Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318–22 (1996) (discussing the state’s interest in passing a drug-testing 
requirement for political candidates, and comparing the instant case to other special needs 
cases). 
214  See supra Section I.A. 
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question could have radical normative consequences for Fourth 
Amendment analysis. It is perhaps for that reason that the Court avoids it. 
A. UNDERSTANDING OBJECTIVE PURPOSE 
Court and commentators invoke the notion of objective purpose in a 
manner that suggests mental-state analysis is used to evaluate individual 
compliance with conduct rules.215 “Conduct rules” refer to laws that govern 
individual behavior in society, such as tort and criminal laws.216 Section 1 
below tests the analogy between objective purpose and mens rea, and 
concludes that it fails. Section 2 then turns to the notion of decision rules in 
search of definition. “Decision rules” dictate what remedies courts can 
make available for conduct-rule violations and under what circumstances 
the courts can grant them. The Court, for example, has directed judges not 
to provide exclusion for many Fourth Amendment violations because doing 
so has no deterrent effect on police. Where conduct rules are addressed to 
individuals in society, decision rules are addressed to judges.217 Section 2 
concludes that objective purpose makes as little sense in the context of 
decision rules as it does in the context of conduct rules. 
Having exhausted the most obvious sources of legal meaning for 
objective purpose in Sections 1 and 2, Section 3 then offers an original 
account grounded in philosophy and political theory. Section 3 shows that 
objective purpose mediates between two contradictory conceptions of 
police officers that awkwardly coexist in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
The first conception relies on an individualistic, transactional frame to cast 
police officers in “cops and robbers” terms. The second conception relies on 
a broader, corporate frame to cast police officers as the State incarnate. 
1. Conduct Rules 
Because criminal procedure governs the investigation and enforcement 
of criminal law violations, there is appeal in thinking of it as akin to 
criminal law for police officers.218 Criminal law, of course, conditions 
 
215  Virtually all of the commentary on the subject frames the subjective-objective 
question in a manner that suggests such a framing. See sources cited supra note 31. 
216  Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two 
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2469–70 (1996) (adopting the terminology 
and concept from Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic 
Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 626 (1984)). 
217  See id. 
218  See id. at 2534 (“[T]he constitutional rules promulgated under the Fourth, Fifth, and 
Sixth Amendments are a species of substantive criminal law for the police: they are the 
conduct rules that the Supreme Court wants the police to follow just as substantive criminal 
 
2. SEKHON 4/6/2017  7:02 PM 
92 SEKHON [Vol. 107 
punishment upon the wrongdoer’s state of mind, or mens rea, of which 
“purpose” is the most exacting.219 For crimes of purpose, the state must 
show that it was the defendant’s desire to produce the forbidden result.220 
As discussed in Part I above, the Court regularly refers to officer purpose 
but disavows subjective analysis.221 
The objective purpose inquiry that the Court uses in Fourth 
Amendment cases, however, is not analogous to mens rea in criminal 
law.222 Purpose, however, generally requires a subjective inquiry while 
negligence generally requires objective inquiry. 
Neither retributivist nor utilitarian accounts—the two dominant 
sources of criminal law theory—of mens rea satisfactorily explain the 
notion of objective purpose. Retributivist accounts are grounded in moral 
individualism and require subjective blameworthiness as a prerequisite for 
punishment.223 That an alleged wrongdoer made a morally incorrect choice 
is the sine qua non of blameworthiness, and mens rea is criminal law’s most 
salient mechanism for distinguishing between its degrees. Purpose describes 
the most culpable mental state.224 It is, by definition, subjective.225 
Objective purpose, therefore, makes no sense. 
Utilitarian theory is better equipped to afford definition of objective 
purpose, but it fails to offer a complete account. Utilitarianism describes a 
range of theories that are concerned with maximizing future welfare.226 
Exclusion is the typical remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation. The 
Court has made clear that this remedy’s only purpose is to deter police 
 
prohibitions are the conduct rules that the legislature wants individual citizens to follow.”). 
219  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02. 
220  Id. 
221  One might object that the Court uses the term purpose to mean something more akin 
to officer motive than mens rea. While criminal law distinguishes between the two, there is 
considerable slippage between the two in practice. A number of criminal laws authorize 
punishment based upon motive—such as hate crimes and sex crimes, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 
249(a)(1)—and, more generally, motive often supplies evidence of mens rea. 
222  For a different view, see Alice Ristroph, Covenants for the Sword, 61 U. TORONTO 
L.J. 657, 671–74 (2011) (arguing that “it is . . . useful to think of the [objective 
reasonableness] inquiry as a variant of a mental-state requirement”). 
223  See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 
453, 457 (1997). 
224  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(a)(1) (defining purpose). To take a textbook example, 
one who deliberately kills pursuant to a plan is worse than one who does so accidentally. See 
JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 346–50 (7th ed. 2012). 
225  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(a)(1). 
226  See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 22–27 (2005) (reviewing classical utilitarian 
theories); Robinson & Darley, supra note 223, at 458–68 (describing theories and identifying 
limitations). 
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officers from committing future constitutional violations, not to compensate 
the defendant for the constitutional harm he endured.227 The point is to 
advance the interests that underlie the Fourth Amendment—privacy, 
liberty, and dignity—not to establish whether a particular officer is 
blameworthy.228 
From a utilitarian vantage, categories of intention are significant only 
to the extent that they distinguish would-be wrongdoers based on how 
readily they might be deterred in the future.229 Mental-state requirements 
simply reflect the policy conclusion that a more significant sanction is 
required to deter those who intentionally misbehave than those who 
accidentally do.230 In other words, specific mens rea categories are just 
placeholders for psychological generalizations about particular categories of 
offenders. So long as the rules actually deter misconduct, the legal label’s 
 
227  See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009) (“[T]he exclusionary 
rule is not an individual right and applies only where it ‘result[s] in appreciable deterrence.’” 
(second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984))). 
The exclusionary remedy has influenced the development of substantive Fourth Amendment 
rights. Nancy Leong, Improving Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 377, 388–90 (2014). Fourth 
Amendment questions are typically adjudicated incident to criminal cases where exclusion is 
the only available remedy. Id. at 388. Of course, a civil remedy is available in other contexts, 
principally § 1983 suits. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). In that context, qualified immunity and 
municipal liability doctrines create a more significant role for subjective notions of fault. See 
Barbara E. Armacost, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused, 51 VAND. L. REV. 583, 589, 
667–70 (1998); Mark R. Brown, The Failure of Fault Under §1983: Municipal Liability for 
State Law Enforcement, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1503, 1504 (1999). Qualified immunity only 
permits an officer to be held individually liable for violating the Fourth Amendment (or any 
other federal right) when the Fourth Amendment right violated was clearly established. See 
Armacost, supra, at 619–24. This is plausibly understood as tantamount to a fault 
requirement, although the Court’s most recent opinion on the subject tends to suggest 
otherwise. See id. But see Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1248 n.6 (2012). A 
municipality may only be held liable where it specifically authorized the violation or was 
deliberately indifferent to training its personnel not to commit such. See Monell v. Dep’t of 
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Commentators have noted that this is also akin to a 
subjective fault standard. See Brown, supra, at 1503–04; see also Teressa E. Ravenell, 
Blame It on the Man: Theorizing the Relationship Between § 1983 Municipal Liability and 
the Qualified Immunity Defense, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 153, 175 (2011) (stating that “the 
Court's approach to municipal liability incorporates questions of fault and blame,” and 
giving examples). 
228  There are criminal laws for punishing officers for particularly egregious Fourth 
Amendment violations. See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2013). 
229  See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2011) (“When the police 
exhibit ‘deliberate,’ ‘reckless,’ or ‘grossly negligent’ disregard for Fourth Amendment 
rights, the deterrent value of exclusion is strong and tends to outweigh the resulting costs.” 
(quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 143)). 
230  See KAPLAN, supra note 224, at 35–46. 
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lexical integrity or consistency is not important. By this view, the Court just 
uses “objective purpose” metaphorically. But the question remains as to 
what precisely “objective purpose” is a metaphor for. 
The most intuitive, utilitarian explanation is that objective purpose 
roughly tracks negligence. Whether in tort or criminal law, liability for 
negligence arises for failures to behave in accordance with an objective 
standard of care, whether deliberate or not.231 For example, where an officer 
accidentally draws the wrong conclusion from the available facts as to 
whether individualized suspicion is present in a particular case, the officer’s 
good faith will not foreclose exclusion.232 In tort and criminal law, the 
hypothetical exercise of imagining what a reasonable person would have 
done in the same circumstances as the alleged wrongdoer creates the 
baseline from which to measure whether the alleged wrongdoer engaged in 
misconduct.233 In Fourth Amendment cases, the Court has identified the 
standard in terms of a hypothetical “objectively reasonable police 
officer.”234 
The analogy between objective purpose and negligence is, however, 
superficial at best. First, the Court has explicitly refused to permit exclusion 
for official negligence in some Fourth Amendment cases.235 Second, the 
reasonable police officer does not seem to function as an empirical baseline 
for assessing officer behavior. Empirical here refers to an average based 
upon actual observations of how others in the relevant community actually 
behave.236 It is unclear which police officers’ conduct is to be “averaged,” if 
that is even possible.237 Police officers are a diverse lot and how any one of 
them might behave likely turns on various occupational and other 
characteristics. For example, the reasonable narcotics officer and reasonable 
patrol officer look at the world through different eyes.238 Whereas a 
 
231  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283. 
232  See supra Section I.A. 
233  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(d) (defining criminal negligence as a substantial 
deviation from what a reasonable person would have done in the same circumstances); see 
also Allen D. Miller & Rohen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323, 324–
25 (2012) (describing in torts context). 
234  See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996). 
235  See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2434 (2011) (denying exclusionary 
remedy for good faith reliance on unconstitutional statute); Herring v. United States, 555 
U.S. 135, 141–43 (2009) (illustrating the same for police negligence with regard to updating 
status of active warrants that are outstanding). 
236  See Miller & Perry, supra note 233, at 370–71 (summarizing features of the model). 
237  But see id. at 325. 
238  See EDWARD CONLON, BLUE BLOOD 158 (2004) (comparing personal experience as 
narcotics officer versus patrol officer). 
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specialized narcotics officer is trained to identify narcotics transactions and 
devote his efforts to doing so, a patrol officer will expend her labor on more 
varied tasks.239 These differences will have considerable bearing on how 
each of the two officers interprets and reacts to her environment. The latter 
may not notice, let alone take any action against, two individuals who 
engage in a quick hand-to-hand exchange on the street, while the former 
sees a narcotics transaction. 
The Court specifically disclaimed an empirical formulation of the 
reasonable officer in both Whren and Atwater. In each of those cases, the 
Court was unmoved by the argument that a reasonable officer in the same 
position as the investigating officer would not have behaved as the 
investigating officer did.240 In Atwater, the Court explicitly recognized that 
a reasonable officer would not have behaved as the arresting officer had.241 
If not empirical,242 the hypothetical reasonable officer must function as 
a normative baseline in some other way.243 One can often discern such 
normative judgments in the traits that are attributed to the hypothetical, 
reasonable person. Those traits of the putative wrongdoer that are included 
and excluded from the reasonable person’s profile represent normative 
judgments about what the law is trying to accomplish and to whom it is 
directed. But, again, the Court has refused to define the reasonable officer 
in terms of salient occupational or other characteristics. This leaves the 
standard so highly abstracted from any actual officer that it does not seem 
like a surrogate for a police officer at all.244 For example, in Atwater, after 
noting the officer’s “extremely poor judgment” and “gratuitous 
humiliation[]” of Atwater, the Court upheld the arrest because, objectively, 
there was probable cause for a seatbelt violation.245 As developed further in 
Section 3 below, the reasonable officer standard better approximates a 
hypothetical magistrate than a police officer. 
 
239  See id.; DAVID E. BARLOW, POLICE IN A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY 14 (2000) (noting 
study that found patrol officers spend less than fifteen percent of on-duty time fighting 
crime); David Weisbund & John E. Eck, What Can Police Do to Reduce Crime, Disorder, 
and Fear?, 593 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 42, 44, 49–51, 57 (2009). 
240  See supra notes 52–65 and accompanying discussion. 
241  Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 346–47 (2001). 
242  See Miller & Perry, supra note 233, at 325 (arguing that such a conception is 
theoretically impossible). 
243  See Victoria Nourse, After the Reasonable Man: Getting over the Subjectivity/
Objectivity Question, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 33, 33–34 (2008) (arguing that the “reasonable 
man” is an institutional “heuristic” for negotiating “majoritarian norms”). 
244  See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996) (noting that the 
personnel manual suggested that undercover officers were not to behave as traffic officers). 
245  Atwater, 532 U.S. 318 at 346–47, 354. 
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2. Decision Rules 
Just as the conduct-rule analogy between criminal procedure and 
criminal law fails to produce a satisfactory account of objective purpose, a 
decision-rule analogy also fails to do so. Objective purpose analysis leads 
courts to ignore officers’ deliberate violations of Fourth Amendment 
conduct rules by instrumentally relying upon a decision rule. This defeats 
the purpose of having decision rules, as highlighted by the isolated 
instances where the Court seems to authorize subjective analysis to ensure a 
decision rule’s integrity.246 
In an ideal world there would be “acoustic separation” preventing the 
individuals who are subject to a set of conduct rules from hearing the 
content of judges’ decision rules.247 This would ensure that individuals did 
not instrumentally rely on decision rules when making choices about 
whether to comply with conduct rules.248 Carol Steiker famously relied on 
the distinction and noted that there is no acoustic separation between police 
officers and courts.249 Officers can easily learn decision rules’ content and 
exploit that knowledge to strategically violate conduct rules.250 
Distinguishing between accidental and deliberate violations of 
criminal procedure decision rules would be a way to make up for acoustic 
separation’s impossibility.251 For example, in the case of “inevitable 
discovery,” evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment would, 
in theory, have eventually been discovered lawfully had the violation never 
occurred.252 According to the Court, exclusion thus leaves the state worse 
off and the defendant better off than if the violation had never occurred.253 
 
246  See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542–43, 443 n.3 (1988) (implying that it 
is appropriate for a magistrate to determine whether the fruits of an illegal search motivated 
application for search warrant); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604–05 (1975) (stating that 
officers’ purposeful violation of Fourth Amendment is factor in determining whether a 
subsequently obtained confession is admissible). See also supra Section I.B. 
247  See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decisions Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation 
in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 625 (1984) (coining the term acoustic separation, 
and defining it as “an imaginary world in which only officials know the content of the 
decision rules and only the general public knows the content of the conduct rules”). 
248  See id. at 633 (describing defense of duress as decision rule). 
249  Steiker, supra note 216, at 2471, 2534. 
250  See id. at 2535 n.329. 
251  See id. at 2471, 2533. 
252  See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443–44, 443 n.4 (1984). 
253  Id. at 444. Carol Steiker argued that the Burger and Rehnquist courts were able to 
undercut the Warren Court’s expansion of criminal procedure conduct rules by creating 
decision rules that permit courts to deny remedies for conduct-rule violations. Steiker, supra 
note 216, at 2504. 
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Under ideal conditions, “acoustic separation” between courts and police 
would prevent officers from learning of the inevitable discovery principle. 
In practice, though, police have ready access to decision rules.254 
The Court’s opinions in Brown v. Illinois and United States v. Murray 
hinted at a willingness to use subjective purpose as an imperfect substitute 
for acoustic separation.255 Ordinarily, the Court will not apply the 
exclusionary rule where the causal relation between the Fourth Amendment 
violation and the incriminating evidence is attenuated.256 In Brown, 
however, the Court stated that this principle may not apply where the 
constitutional violation was purposeful.257 In Murray, officers seized 
narcotics pursuant to a warrant, but that warrant had been obtained 
following an illegal “sneak and peek” search confirming the contraband’s 
presence.258 The Court held that evidence should be suppressed unless the 
warrant-issuing magistrate had an opportunity to decide whether the illegal 
search actually motivated the officers’ decision to seek a warrant.259 This 
seems to invite magistrates to delve into officers’ subjective motivations, 
although the Court does not state that explicitly. Even if so, Brown and 
Murray are hard to generalize upon. 
In the main, the Court is nearly as disinterested in subjective analysis 
in the context of decision rules as it is in the context of conduct rules. For 
example, in Nix v. Williams, the Court allowed officers’ deliberate 
exploitation of a decision rule to stand.260 The Court held that the officers’ 
bad faith had no bearing on the inevitable discovery doctrine’s 
application.261 Even more striking was the Court’s decision in United States 
v. Payner.262 There, IRS agents instrumentally relied upon Fourth 
Amendment standing rules to break into a banker’s hotel room and steal 
documents that incriminated Payner.263 Fourth Amendment standing 
 
254  See Steiker, supra note 216, at 2471, 2534. 
255  See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542–43, 443 n.3 (1988) (implying that it 
is appropriate for a magistrate to determine whether the fruits of an illegal search motivated 
application for search warrant); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604–05 (1975) (stating that 
officers’ purposeful violation of Fourth Amendment is a factor in determining whether a 
subsequently obtained confession is admissible). See also supra Section I.B. 
256  See Brown, 422 U.S. at 604–05. 
257  See id. 
258  See sources cited supra notes 139–148 and discussion for summary of case. 
259  See sources cited supra notes 139–148 and discussion for summary of case. 
260  See sources cited supra notes 124–127 and accompanying discussion. 
261  See sources cited supra notes 124–127 and accompanying discussion. 
262  447 U.S. 727 (1980). 
263  Id. at 729–31; see also Steiker, supra note 216 at 2509–10 (arguing that “[t]he 
strictness of the current standing regime makes it much more likely that cases will arise in 
 
2. SEKHON 4/6/2017  7:02 PM 
98 SEKHON [Vol. 107 
principles only permit individuals whose privacy has been infringed to 
move for exclusion of the unconstitutionally seized evidence.264 In Payner, 
that was the banker, not defendant Payner.265 The Court permitted the 
evidence’s admission despite the agents’ egregiously deliberate 
constitutional violation. 
On both the conduct rule and decision rule fronts, objective purpose 
holds sway. But in neither context is the Court transparent about what the 
expression means or what analytical work it is doing. One must mine 
deeper for answers to those questions. 
3. Accounting for Objective Purpose 
The transactional framing266 of criminal procedure disputes makes it 
easy to confuse police officers’ status as individuals and state agents. This 
section demonstrates that objective purpose is a rhetorical device for 
managing the tension between individual and state purpose in Fourth 
Amendment cases. 
a. Individual Versus State Purpose 
The Court’s reliance on purpose reflects not only the concept’s 
centrality to our notions of moral and legal responsibility, but also the 
extent to which most Fourth Amendment disputes are framed as 
transactional. In the typical case, the locus of inquiry is the point of contact 
between an individual police officer and an individual citizen. This 
litigation posture leads the typical Fourth Amendment dispute to feel like a 
private dispute even though it is not. In private disputes between 
individuals, the moment preceding the parties’ encounter serves as a 
baseline for whether there was harm.267 And the putative wrongdoer’s state 
of mind (or negligence) determines responsibility for that harm.268 That an 
officer is investigating or enforcing particular criminal laws in a particular 
place, however, is not a simple matter of personal choice. Departmental 
directive determines his assignment to a particular beat, unit, and perhaps 
 
which law enforcement agents can exploit the fact that the “target” of their investigation will 
lack standing to contest searches and seizures designed to obtain evidence against him or 
her,” and discussing Payner as an example). 
264  See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 136–38 (1978). 
265  See Payner, 447 U.S. at 735. 
266  I have borrowed the expression from Daryl Levinson. Levinson, supra note 23. 
267  Id. at 1319. 
268  Id. 
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even his focus on specific kinds of crime or suspects.269 Notions of 
individual purpose fail to adequately capture those dynamics. 
Purpose has unique cultural and philosophical salience in defining 
conceptions of public and private morality. Justice Holmes’s adage that 
“even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being 
kicked,”270 says less about dogs’ moral acuity than it does about humans’ 
preoccupation with typologizing intentionality.271 That preoccupation finds 
expression in (and is, in turn, reaffirmed by) law and philosophy. The law 
generally forbids kicking others, but often permits stumbling into them. 
Common law categories of criminal and tort liability turn upon distinctions 
between intentional, foreseeable, and purely accidental acts.272 Philosophers 
have long been preoccupied with identifying the moral bases for these 
distinctions.273 Many have offered various defenses for the intuition,274 
although recent scholarship questions its normative plausibility.275 
Even if there is a plausible distinction to be drawn between intentional 
and foreseeable conduct for individuals, it cannot be extrapolated to the 
State. David Enoch has recently argued that doing so is incorrect because 
states are “artificial” agents that cannot be analogized to real human 
beings.276 State institutions are comprised of multiple individuals who 
collaborate (or compete) to make collective choices through what are often 
complex decision-making processes.277 Enoch also argues against “taking 
the state out of the picture altogether and focusing instead on the mental 
states of the []real, natural, individual[] decision-makers.”278 Such 
 
269  Sekhon, supra note 52, at 1186–91. 
270  OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 2 (Stephen L. Carter ed., 2009). 
271  David Enoch, Intending, Foreseeing, and the State, 13 LEGAL THEORY 69, 71 (2007). 
272  I am using these words colloquially here. We often refer to foreseeable but intended 
consequences as accidental, but they have a different moral (and, often legal) status than 
totally unforeseen consequences. Id. at 90–91. 
273  See id. at 71–72. 
274  They tend to use puzzles to isolate the relevant moral features of human agency. 
Trolley hypotheticals are grist for the philosophical mill: a runaway trolley car barrels 
towards a fork, five hapless souls lounge on one track, while just one lounges on the other 
track. It seems morally permissible to steer the trolley into the one rather than the five, but 
not to kill an individual and use her organs to save five people. The intuitive difference turns 
on intending a harmful result as opposed to merely foreseeing it. See id. 
275  See id. 
276  See id. at 85–86. 
277  They are capable of behaving in fundamentally inconsistent ways that cannot be 
analogized to real persons. See Philip Pettit, Akrasia, Collective and Individual, in 
WEAKNESS OF WILL AND PRACTICAL IRRATIONALITY 68, 71–75 (Sarah Stroud & Christine 
Tappolet eds., 2003). 
278  Enoch, supra note 271, at 86. 
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individuals are acting in their capacities as state officials, not as natural 
individuals. They may be vested with special authority not of their own 
making and be required to behave in ways that are impermissible in their 
capacities as real, natural individuals. This is certainly true of police 
officers. 
The distinction between intention and foresight also falters with regard 
to the states’ choices because, unlike with private individuals, there is no 
readily identifiable baseline for measuring fault and harm. The common 
law’s transactional framing of disputes is unhelpful because it creates a 
baseline to measure harm and fault by isolating the moment just before one 
party ran afoul of the other.279 Using that baseline to judge state conduct—
particularly, its constitutionality—ignores the fact that the state’s acts and 
omissions have always already run afoul of someone. Put differently, 
policymaking requires that the state make cost-cost tradeoffs.280 The state’s 
choice to regulate particular conduct will typically rearrange an existing 
pattern of costs and benefits. Similarly, electing not to regulate ratifies an 
existing distribution of benefits and burdens. Sunstein and Vermeule 
illustrate the dynamic using the death penalty.281 If it actually deters 
homicides, then any choice the state might make about permitting or 
prohibiting it will result in lives lost, it is just a question of whose lives. 
While the example is fraught, the basic insight applies to most any context 
in which the state has the power to regulate.282 
The transactional framing of most Fourth Amendment cases confuses 
the line between individual and state purpose analysis.283 Even more than 
other areas of constitutional law,284 criminal procedure cases rely upon 
transactional framing. Fourth Amendment questions typically arise in 
connection with individual criminal cases, not as broad structural 
challenges to law enforcement practices. Often enough, officers are direct 
participants in the criminal transaction. For example, in many narcotics 
cases an undercover police buyer initiates the illegal transaction. Even when 
the officer is not directly involved in the transaction that creates criminal 
liability, she is often intimately bound up with it: whether by directly 
observing the misconduct or its immediate aftermath, aiding victims, taking 
 
279  See Levinson, supra note 23. 
280  See id. at 1378. 
281  Cass Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? Acts, 
Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703, 724–25 (2005). 
282  See id. 
283  See Ristroph, supra note 222, at 660–61, 678 (arguing based on Hobbes that such 
confusion is endemic to the nature of sovereignty). 
284  See Levinson, supra note 23, at 1337–38. 
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statements at the scene, and so on. This lends to framing Fourth 
Amendment disputes as dramatic, oppositional encounters between 
individuals. Not coincidentally, “cops and robbers” is law school slang for 
the criminal procedure course focusing on the Fourth Amendment. 
But the modern police officer is not an individual in the ordinary 
sense. Police officers are state actors who are embedded in hierarchical, 
bureaucratic structures that enable and constrain their behavior through 
mandates, rules, and personnel policy.285 The discretion that police officers 
do enjoy is wielded for public, not personal gain. 
b. Objective Purpose Mediates Between Individual and Corporate 
Conceptions of Police Officers. 
By casting its Fourth Amendment purpose inquiry as objective, the 
Court simultaneously invokes the deeply familiar, individualized concept of 
purpose and disavows it.286 Objective purpose is a rhetorical device for 
attributing a corporate, state purpose to individual officers. Implicitly, that 
is to conceive of individual officers as “the state” when interacting with 
suspects in the field. The state, however, is not unitary. It does not make 
sense to equate officers with the state vis-à-vis courts. Accordingly, in the 
limited instances when an officer has directly perpetrated a hoax on a court, 
the Court seems more willing to permit scrutiny of an officer’s subjective, 
individual motivations. 
The Court’s notion of objective purpose implicitly casts individual 
officers as the state personified vis-à-vis citizens.287 It does this by 
attributing any legitimate basis that the state might have had for the search 
or seizure to the individual officer. In most contexts, the Court has deemed 
it irrelevant that an illegitimate motive led a particular officer to search or 
seize so long as any other police officer could have legitimately engaged in 
the same search or seizure.288 This analysis tracks that of a hypothetical 
magistrate ex ante. Assume that the actual officer had an opportunity to 
apply for a warrant and did so. If the applying officer made a factual error 
in the application—for example, incorrectly thinking that probable cause 
existed because of fact X when, in actuality, it existed because of fact Y—
this would not prevent the magistrate from issuing a warrant so long as she 
was made aware of fact Y. Similarly, an officer’s misidentification of the 
 
285  See Sekhon, supra note 52, at 1186–91. 
286  See sources cited supra notes 83–91 and discussion. 
287  Cf. Ristroph, supra note 222, at 672, 674 (characterizing “objective reasonableness” 
as a form of “sovereign mens rea”). 
288  See sources cited supra notes 52–65 and discussion. 
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relevant law would not prevent the magistrate from concluding that there 
was probable cause to believe some other crime had been committed. This 
is, in effect, to impute a legal rationale to the investigating officer if any 
such rationale is available based upon all observable facts and applicable 
criminal laws. This is true even if, subjectively speaking, nothing other than 
the investigating officer’s illegitimate motivation accounted for her 
conduct.289 
The Court’s objective purpose inquiry, in effect, evaluates individual 
officer’s choices as coextensive with the state’s broad discretion to enforce 
criminal law. The jurisprudence is less calibrated to developing specific 
conduct rules for officers than it is to roughly defining the outer bounds of 
the state’s investigation and enforcement discretion. For example, criminal 
procedure permits any officer to search or seize any time there is probable 
cause to think that an individual has violated any criminal law.290 There are 
countless criminal laws that apply to a vast range of human conduct.291 This 
creates vast enforcement opportunities for the state and, by extension, 
police officers.292 Even when an officer violates a constitutional conduct 
rule, criminal procedure permits exclusion only if there is but-for cause 
linking that officer’s conduct to the evidence seized.293 If some other state 
agent, behaving constitutionally, would have discovered the same evidence, 
it is admissible.294 The officer’s individual constitutional obligations 
dissolve into the state’s corporate ones. 
The big exception seems to be where officers directly perpetrate a 
hoax upon a court by, for example, lying on a warrant application. The 
Supreme Court seems more willing to permit exploration of their subjective 
intentions in these situations.295 Because the state is not unitary, it makes 
little sense to treat officers as the state embodied when they are seeking the 
court’s authorization to search or seize. In these circumstances, the Court 
treats them more akin to individuals and is more willing to delve into their 
minds’ subjective workings. The Court has made clear that purposeful or 
even reckless misrepresentations of fact in a warrant application will 
invalidate a subsequent search. 
 
289  See sources cited supra notes 52–65 and discussion. 
290  See supra Section I.A. 
291  See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
505, 514–15 (2001) (describing state and federal criminal codes). 
292  See id. at 519. 
293  See supra text accompanying notes 121–29. 
294  See supra Section I.A.3. 
295  See supra Section I.B. 
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This willingness to scrutinize subjective officer intent in these 
situations finds parallels in other criminal procedure contexts where state 
agents may have perpetrated a hoax upon a court. For example, the Fifth 
Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause permits courts to scrutinize 
prosecutor’s subjective motives to assess whether she “intended to ‘goad’ 
the defendant into moving for a mistrial.”296 Where she has, double 
jeopardy forecloses subsequent retrial.297 The Court’s willingness to 
scrutinize subjective intentions where judicial process is concerned likely 
owes something to judgments about institutional competence. Courts may 
be better equipped to undertake subjective state-of-mind analyses where it 
pertains to in-court misconduct. This pragmatic account, however, is not 
theoretically satisfying. Nor does it entirely capture the Court’s willingness 
to evaluate subjective motivations. 
The more it seems that police officers are deliberately perpetrating a 
hoax upon the courts, the more amenable the Supreme Court is to 
considering their subjective intentions. For example, in Missouri v. 
Seibert,298 the Court paid close attention to officers’ subjective intentions 
without being entirely forthright that it was doing so. In Seibert, the Court 
concluded that officers violated the defendant’s Miranda rights by engaging 
in a two-phase interrogation.299 In the first phase, officers extracted a 
confession without having Mirandized Seibert.300 In the second phase, the 
officers Mirandized Seibert and then asked her to reiterate the confession.301 
The interrogation tactic appeared to have been based upon a strategic 
reading of the Court’s earlier decision in Elstad v. Oregon.302 In that case an 
officer inadvertently questioned (and obtained a confession from) the 
suspect prior to Mirandizing him.303 After Mirandizing the suspect, the 
officer then obtained a second confession.304 The Court held that the 
Miranda warning, in effect, cured the officer’s initial error—that is, 
recitation of the Miranda warning was sufficient to apprise the suspect of 
 
296  Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 676 (1982). 
297  Id. 
298  542 U.S. 600 (2004). 
299  Id. at 604 (plurality). 
300  Id. at 605. 
300  Id. at 604–05. 
301  Id. at 605. 
302  Id. at 609, 614–15. 
303  470 U.S. 298, 301 (1985). 
304  Id. 
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his rights and allow him to make an intelligent choice regarding waiver 
despite his already having confessed once.305 
Although the structure of the interrogation in Seibert was identical to 
that in Elstad, the big difference was that the officers in Seibert deliberately 
elicited the first confession. This was not lost on the Court in Seibert, 
although the plurality was loathe to make the point explicitly. The plurality 
reasoned that the police tactic was unconstitutional because it “effectively 
threaten[ed] to thwart Miranda’s purpose.”306 Concurring, Justice Kennedy 
called the interrogation a “deliberate violation of Miranda,” and wrote that 
there should be a remedy for any tactic that “was used in a calculated way 
to undermine the Miranda warning.”307 
Officer duplicity vis-à-vis courts raise obvious difficulties in a divided 
state. An officer stratagem to circumvent constitutional restraint à la Seibert 
undermines not only judicial authority, but also the underlying point that 
the constitutional rule is supposed to serve. The latter, of course, is 
generally true whenever police officers deliberately circumvent 
constitutional principles. While the Court seems to, at least implicitly, 
recognize this problem, it has not built a jurisprudence that meaningfully 
addresses it. 
The Court’s use of objective purpose analysis obfuscates the nature of 
police officers’ public role by falsely suggesting an analogy to mens rea or 
negligence. In fact, the notion awkwardly mediates the tension between the 
individual and corporate conceptualizations of officers. 
B. UNDERSTANDING PROGRAMMATIC PURPOSE 
The special needs and administrative exception cases oblige the Court 
to more directly address state purpose because they involve institutional 
decisionmaking. In those cases, the Court employs what it terms 
programmatic-purpose analysis.308 Programmatic purpose is best 
understood as a metaphor for the broad policy impulses that animate state 
decisionmaking—more colloquially, a policy’s underlying point or goal. 
Section 1 below suggests that this understanding of purpose has deep 
resonances with constitutional means-ends testing. 
 
305  Elstad v. Oregon, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985). 
306  Seibert, 542 U.S. at 617. 
307  Id. at 620, 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
308  See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 405 (2006) (emphasizing the word 
programmatic in distinguishing programmatic-purpose  inquiry from subjective motive 
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Section 2 demonstrates that programmatic purpose is substantially 
underdeveloped in comparison to means-ends testing in other constitutional 
contexts. This is because the Court has refused to define whether criminal 
law enforcement is an end or a means. In addition, the Court has not 
consistently used the principle of fit in those cases where analysis is called 
for. Nor has the Court devoted sufficient attention to what the Fourth 
Amendment requires of the relationship between a particular institution’s 
purpose and the individual agents who are responsible for advancing that 
purpose in the field. 
1. Purpose is a Method for Reviewing Institutional Choice 
While purpose evokes a state-of-mind analysis in criminal and tort 
law, the concept also has deep purchase as a device for understanding 
public institutions’ choices.309 The Court appears to recognize as much 
when it appends “programmatic” to qualify purpose analysis in the special 
needs and administrative exception cases.310 
There is a relationship—although not entirely felicitous—between 
these two distinct notions of purpose. We often imagine the state as if it 
were a large individual that possesses intentions analogous to those of a real 
person. Scholars have criticized such a conception for reasons noted 
above.311 Nor should institutional choices be reduced to the aggregation of 
constituent decisionmakers’ individual intentions.312 Even if empirically 
possible to identify each individual’s actual intentions, aggregating them 
will often fail to produce a coherent portrait of institutional purpose. For 
example, legislation scholars have long recognized that wildly disparate 
motivations may account for individual legislators’ choices with regard to a 
particular bill.313 In addition, deliberative processes have the capacity to 
generate internally inconsistent results.314 This means that an institutional 
actor cannot behave with the kind of “rational unity” that philosophers 
would expect of an “intentional agent.”315 
But corporate entities still can act pursuant to a general plan or towards 
a rough goal. To be intelligible as policy, there has to be some reasonably 
 
309  See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 52 (1986). 
310  See supra Section I.C. 
311  See supra Section II.A.3(a). 
312  See Enoch, supra note 271, at 87. 
313  See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation As 
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 326 (1990). 
314  See Pettit, supra note 277, at 71–75. 
315  See id. at 73–74. 
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clear answer to the question, “What is the point?” Were it otherwise, liberal 
governance would impossible. The liberal state is, by definition, one that is 
both reasonably responsive to its constituents’ desires and subject to 
constitutional principles of justice.316 The state must have the capacity to act 
in ways that constituents can identify and challenge. All of this presupposes 
some kind of shared political vocabulary and some reasonably specific state 
goals to agree or disagree about.317 
Liberal theories of the state are preoccupied with identifying the kinds 
of goals that the state might legitimately pursue and the constraints they 
may be subject to. For example, in John Rawls’ formulation, a liberal state 
may legitimately pursue majoritarian ends subject to libertarian and 
distributive restrictions.318 These principles of justice both restrict the range 
of legitimate goals that the state may pursue and the methods by which 
those legitimate goals might be advanced.319 These constraints on state ends 
and means have deep resonance in our constitutional jurisprudence. 
“Means-ends testing” is a staple of constitutional jurisprudence. It 
requires the Court to evaluate the “fit” between a state’s legitimate goals 
and the method that it uses to advance those goals.320 The degree of fit 
required varies depending upon the nature of the goal. Roughly speaking, 
the more legitimate the goal, the more leeway the state has to pursue it. The 
more constitutionally suspect the goal, the less leeway the state has to 
pursue it. 
For example, the First Amendment severely limits the state’s ability to 
regulate “protected speech.”321 For less constitutionally significant 
categories of speech—lewd speech or fraud, for instance—the state enjoys 
considerably more leeway to regulate.322 To the extent that the state restricts 
protected speech in the course of pursuing some other legitimate goal—for 
example, banning depictions of animal cruelty in order to forestall future 
animal cruelty323—it must demonstrate that it employed the “least 
 
316  See DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES 202 (1989). 
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318  See RAWLS, supra note 226, at 312–15. 
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restrictive means” to do so.324 The state cannot limit any more speech than 
is absolutely necessary to accomplish its legitimate goal.325 This prevents 
both pretextual state behavior and sloppiness. 
Equal protection analysis is similar. There are some goals that the state 
may not pursue at all: for example, racial segregation for its own sake. 
Where the state distributes benefits or burdens based upon a suspect 
classification, such as race, to accomplish some other ostensibly legitimate 
goal, such as preventing fights in prison,326 the goal must be exceedingly 
important.327 The Court evaluates the state’s proffered goal with “strict 
scrutiny” in order to root out pretext.328 Where the state relies upon a 
suspect classification, strict scrutiny review virtually presumes that any 
nonracial goal is pretextual.329 Even if a state’s goal is compelling, 
however, the Court also evaluates whether the suspect classification is 
“narrowly tailored” to accomplish the goal.330 This onerous standard 
requires the state to show that it did not rely on race any more than 
necessary to accomplish its exceedingly important goal.331 
In contrast, state practices rarely fail to satisfy the less rigorous 
rational-basis review.332 When the state distributes benefits or burdens on 
the basis of a nonsuspect classification without impinging upon any 
fundamental right, the Court only requires that the classification be 
rationally related to a legitimate goal.333 States, for example, have broad 
discretion to distribute taxation’s benefits and burdens as they see fit.334 The 
Court usually reviews the state’s purpose for bare plausibility, sometimes 
accepting post hoc rationales or supplying them itself.335 For legislative 
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acts, there is no obligation that the legislature itself have articulated the 
rationale for the challenged policy.336 And the fit between means and ends 
need not be particularly tight; the state’s conduct just cannot be 
“irrational.”337 
2. Programmatic Purpose is Stunted Means-Ends Testing 
The Court’s programmatic purpose is a form of means-ends testing. It 
is, however, considerably underdeveloped in comparison to the tiered 
system of review used in other constitutional contexts.338 The Court has 
held that open-ended interest balancing for reasonableness is permissible 
when an agency’s primary purpose is other than ordinary crime control.339 
If the goal is ordinary crime control, the Fourth Amendment requires 
individualized suspicion.340 The Court, however, has not advanced a 
principle for distinguishing when (or whether) criminal enforcement is an 
“end” and when it is a “means.” The Court has permitted interest balancing 
in cases in which law enforcement has used criminal enforcement as a 
means to achieve some ostensibly noncriminal end.341 In addition, the Court 
has not developed clear rules of fit between means and ends where a state’s 
primary purpose is noncriminal. 
The Court’s special needs and administrative exception cases turn on 
whether the state’s primary purpose was crime control. For example, in 
Edmond, Indianapolis stated that its goal in erecting a vehicle roadblock 
was interdicting illegal drugs.342 This made it easy for the Court to conclude 
that the roadblock’s primary purpose was ordinary crime control without 
having to offer guidance on how to distinguish between primary and 
secondary purposes. 343 In Ferguson, the Court suggested that the distinction 
between primary and secondary purposes is a distinction between 
“ultimate” and “immediate” goals.344 There, a state hospital forwarded 
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evidence that pregnant women were addicted to cocaine to law 
enforcement.345 While the state’s ultimate goal in Ferguson might have 
“been to get the [cocaine-addicted] women in question into substance abuse 
treatment and off of drugs, the immediate objective of the searches was to 
generate evidence for law enforcement purposes in order to reach that 
goal.”346 Ferguson suggests that when criminal enforcement is used as a 
means for achieving a noncriminal goal, the standard requirements of 
individualized suspicion apply.347 Otherwise, special needs would swallow 
all of criminal procedure “[b]ecause [criminal] law enforcement 
involvement always serves some broader social purpose or 
objective . . . .”348 
The distinction between immediate and ultimate goals drawn in 
Ferguson, however, does not sit comfortably with the Court’s holding in 
New York v. Burger or in earlier roadblock cases.349 In both Martinez-
Fuerte and Sitz, roadblock cases predating Ferguson, the Court approved 
the suspicionless roadblocks for ostensibly noncriminal purposes—
preventing undocumented migration and drunk driving, respectively.350 But 
the state relied upon criminal law enforcement to advance both of those 
policy purposes.351 A police department or most other state actors are 
unlikely to describe criminal law enforcement as valuable for its own sake. 
Such enforcement usually advances some broader, underlying policy 
goal.352 
In Burger, the Court permitted the warrantless search of a junkyard for 
evidence of stolen cars pursuant to a New York state statute that authorized 
police officers to conduct “administrative inspections.”353 The Court 
concluded that the legislature’s purpose was administrative, not criminal.354 
 
alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560–61 
(1976))). 
345  Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 71–73. 
346  Id. at 82–83 (footnote omitted). 
347  See id. at 82–84. 
348  Id. at 84. 
349  482 U.S. 691, 693 (1987). The Ferguson majority attempts to distinguish Burger. 
See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 83 n.21. 
350  Mich. Dep’t State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451, 455 (1990); United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 552, 561–62 (1976). 
351  Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450–52; Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 552. 
352  See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451 (describing the “tragedy” of drunk driving); Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 551−52 (discussing the years-long national policy to limit immigration 
into the United States). 
353  Burger, 482 U.S. at 693. 
354  See id. at 708−10. 
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The Court understood the inspection statute’s goal as reducing the 
economic harms associated with auto theft.355 Of course, the same might 
have been said about criminal statutes punishing auto theft.356 The 
administrative inspection statute itself made it a crime to refuse to cooperate 
with the police.357 The police could also use evidence seized in the so-called 
administrative search in a theft case against the individual whose business 
was subjected to administrative search.358 That is exactly what the state did 
when it prosecuted Burger.359 The opinion suggests that there is nothing 
problematic about using criminal means to pursue noncriminal ends.360 
Similarly, in cruel-and-unusual-punishment and double-jeopardy 
cases, the Court has refused to characterize criminal punishment as a means 
or ends. Rather than squarely addressing what “criminal” means, the Court 
has deferred to legislative labels.361 This, with few exceptions, has been true 
even in cases where the state has used the “civil” label to describe harsh, 
custodial practices that most laypersons would think of as criminal.362 The 
notion that criminal punishment is an end is deeply retributive. By this 
view, criminal law exists so that the state may inflict suffering upon a 
blameworthy person in strict proportion to the moral wrong the 
blameworthy person has done.363 By a utilitarian view, criminal punishment 
is a kind of super-deterrent that might be used to achieve any number of 
public policy ends.364 The Court resisted the conclusion that the 
 
355  Id. at 708−09. 
356  See id. at 712–14. 
357  Id. at 694 n.1. 
358  See id. at 716. 
359  Id. at 695–96. The Court did make the slightest nod of recognition that there might 
be a pretext problem. See id. at 716 n.27 (stating that “[t]here is . . . no reason to believe that 
the instant inspection was actually a ‘pretext’ for obtaining evidence of respondent's 
violation of the penal laws”). 
360  See id. at 716. 
361  See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997). 
362  See id. at 361−62 (permitting civil detention of sex offenders following completion 
of criminal sentence, and finding that civil commitment “does not implicate either of the two 
primary objectives of criminal punishment: retribution or deterrence”). In the immigration 
context, lengthy civil detention is quite common. See, e.g., David Cole, In Aid of Removal: 
Due Process Limits on Immigration Detention, 51 EMORY L.J. 1003, 1004−08 (2002) 
(describing instances of immigration detention); Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation is 
Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299, 1301−02 (2011) (noting how harsh deportation can be 
for deportees). 
363  See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 31 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
364  E.g., Burger, 482 U.S. at 712−14 (justifying the use of criminal procedural tools—
i.e., searches by law enforcement—to serve both administrative and criminal goals). 
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Constitution does not require legislatures to choose among these or any of 
the other available rationales for criminalizing conduct.365 While federalism 
concerns may weigh in favor of deferring to legislative prerogatives, the 
same is not true for police departments’ choices. The Court, however, does 
not seem poised to scrutinize the latter’s choices more vigorously.  
Even if it were clear whether criminal enforcement was means or ends, 
questions of how to judge fit between the two would remain. King 
highlights the broad questions that remain outstanding. The reasonableness 
balancing in King is redolent of the least stringent version of rational basis 
review. The Court credited what appeared to be incidental reasons—if not 
entirely hypothetical ones—for the DNA testing policy. In assessing 
Maryland’s goals, the Court assiduously avoided any reference to the most 
obvious (and likely actual) reason for Maryland’s DNA collection practices. 
The statute’s preamble indicated that the state had authorized DNA 
collection in order to solve past crimes.366 Notwithstanding, the Court 
upheld the practice’s constitutionality based upon what it identified as the 
state’s administrative goal in properly identifying arrestees.367 This 
outweighed the minimally intrusive cheek swab by which police collected 
arrestees’ genetic material.368 In previous special needs cases, the Court 
paid considerably more attention to the state’s actual reasons for carrying 
out the searches. 369 
While the Court has never required that the state use the least 
restrictive means to accomplish its special need,370 it has generally required 
that those needs be more than hypothetical. For example, in Skinner, 
suspicionless drug testing was limited to those railroad employees in safety-
sensitive positions.371 A review of railroad accidents triggered the testing 
requirement.372 In addition, there was evidence to suggest that intoxication 
on the job was a problem.373 Similarly in Acton, there was an actual drug 
use problem in the school district, and evidence suggested that student 
athletes were driving it.374 While there was no evidence of an actual drug 
 
365  E.g., Ewing, 538 U.S. at 25 (plurality opinion). 
366  Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1985 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
367  See id. at 1970. 
368  Id. at 1977–78. 
369  See supra Section I.C. 
370  See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n., 489 U.S. 602, 629 n.9 (1989). 
371  Id. at 620. 
372  Id. at 607–08. 
373  Id. at 606–07. 
374  Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 648−49 (1995). 
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use problem among Treasury employees in Von Raab,375 the Court 
determined that suspicionless drug testing was permissible for those 
employees in specific, security-sensitive positions.376 In none of the three 
cases was there any suggestion that the state’s purpose for suspicionless 
drug testing was securing convictions.377 King is to the contrary; indeed, 
King was convicted after being tied to an unsolved case by his DNA.378 
To summarize the disarray: a special-needs search is permitted where 
an institution’s primary goal is noncriminal. But the institution can use 
criminal means to achieve its noncriminal goal. Further, the Court is 
agnostic as to whether criminal punishment is means or ends. 
Notwithstanding, the Court will sometimes scrutinize the fit between means 
and ends vigorously to ensure that criminal means have not subsumed a 
noncriminal end. Other times though, the Court will not scrutinize fit with 
any vigor at all. The Court has not announced when it will do the former 
and when it will do the latter. 
3. The Relationship Between Institutional Purpose and Officer  
Purpose is Murky 
The disarray surrounding Fourth Amendment regulation of 
institutional choice is compounded by lack of guidance on what steps 
institutions must take to ensure that their individual agents effect a non-
crime-control programmatic purpose. This is the problem of pretext. The 
question is most pressing for police agencies and officers because the power 
to make a criminal arrest is a background fact regardless of what the 
department’s primary programmatic goal may be. Even if one could neatly 
define a legislature’s or police department’s purpose as civil, it is not clear 
why or how that would map onto individual police officers’ motivations in 
a particular situation. While the Court has made veiled allusions to the 
dangers of pretext in such cases,379 it has not developed principles to 
forestall their realization. Burger is illustrative. 
 
375  Justice Scalia emphasized this point in his dissent in National Treasury Employees 
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 682, 685−86 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
376  Id. at 677 (majority opinion). The case was remanded for fact finding regarding 
other, nonsecurity related positions covered by the suspicionless drug testing requirement. 
Id. at 678. 
377  See id. at 663 (showing test results not transmitted to prosecutor); see also Acton, 
515 U.S. at 651 (suggesting the same). In Skinner, there was no prohibition on forwarding 
results to law enforcement, but no evidence that that had happened. 489 U.S. at 621 n.5. 
378  Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1966 (2013). 
379  See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 716 n.27 (1987); Colorado v. Bertine, 
479 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
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 In Burger, police officers were charged with executing the 
administrative search authorized by the New York legislature. The 
legislature created the scheme to deter auto theft.380 Because this deterrence 
regime was designed to achieve the same goal that underlies criminal laws 
prohibiting auto theft, it is questionable that there could be any neat 
distinction between criminal and administrative purposes in this setting.381 
Nonetheless, the Court concluded that the search was administrative, not 
criminal.382 The opinion implies that the officers’ purpose in carrying out 
the suspicionless search was continuous with the legislature’s purpose in 
creating the statute.383 Whether that was actually true is questionable.384 The 
Court stated that if officers come across evidence of “crimes in the course 
of an otherwise proper administrative inspection” that evidence is 
admissible to convict.385 It is unclear what “otherwise proper” means. Is it 
enough that the officers are acting pursuant to legislative authorization, or 
must the officers’ purpose actually be consistent with the legislature’s 
purpose? 
Similarly, the Court has approved roadblock searches without 
specifying what, if any, alignment there must be between the department’s 
and an individual officer’s intentions. Recall that in Martinez-Fuerte and 
Sitz, the Court approved suspicionless roadblocks for ostensibly 
noncriminal, public policy purposes—preventing undocumented 
immigration and drunk driving, respectively.386 In both cases there were 
criminal laws prohibiting the conduct. Officers subjected motorists to more 
intensive, secondary searches based upon information gleaned in the initial, 
suspicionless search.387 The Court has suggested that the initial, 
suspicionless searches should be conducted according to a protocol that 
minimizes the discretion exercised by the individual officers staffing the 
checkpoint.388 Beyond that, however, the Court has not indicated whether 
the Fourth Amendment imposes any additional constraints upon officer 
 
380  See Burger, 482 U.S. at 698. 
381  The dissenters in Burger hinted at this very conclusion. See id. at 728 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
382  Id. at 712 (majority opinion). 
383  See id. at 717 (“So long as a regulatory scheme is properly administrative, it is not 
rendered illegal by the fact that the inspecting officer has the power to arrest individual for 
violation other than those created by the scheme itself.”). 
384  See id. at 694 n.2. 
385  Id. at 716 (emphasis added). 
386  See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990); United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 552 (1976). 
387  See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450–51; Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 549–50. 
388  See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559. 
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discretion than would ordinarily apply. If individual officers understand 
their jobs to be making arrests,389 they might view a roadblock as an 
opportunity to do so regardless of the department’s official statement of 
purpose. For example, officers staffing a roadblock might aggressively use 
Terry stops or consent to maximize secondary searches and arrests.390 In 
Edmond, the state made it easy for the Court to conclude that the 
roadblock’s primary purpose was criminal by conceding that it was set up 
for drug interdiction.391 Had the department described the roadblock’s 
purpose as “keeping drug-addled drivers off the road,” it might have 
seemed analogous to the constitutional drunk-driving checkpoint in Sitz.392 
Such rebranding likely would not have dissuaded individual officers from 
making just as many narcotics arrests at the checkpoint. 
Even when the Court has explicitly recognized that an institutional 
practice may be rife with opportunities for individual agents to behave 
pretextually, it has not imposed serious constraints. For example, in 
Colorado v. Bertine, a three-justice concurrence recognized that the 
inventory search exception is problematic because it creates opportunities 
for police officers to pretextually search for evidence of criminal 
wrongdoing.393 To prevent this from occurring, the concurrence indicated 
that inventory searches should be conducted pursuant to departmental 
regulations that prescribe when and how such searches are to be carried 
out.394 In subsequent cases, however, the Court clarified that such 
regulations could leave considerable discretion to individual officers.395 
Much like in the roadblock context, the Court has created an incentive for 
departments to create some sort of general policy, but not necessarily to 
actually restrain officer discretion. 
Scrutinizing the intersection of institutional and individual purposes in 
the special needs or administrative contexts might strike the Court as a 
slippery slope. Other traditional crime-control cases could readily be recast 
as disputes about the disjuncture between programmatic purpose and 
 
389  See Sekhon, supra note 52, at 1207–08 (describing how N.Y.P.D. encouraged 
officers to view their responsibility in terms of making arrests). 
390  In Terry v. Ohio, the Court authorized police officers to make brief investigatory 
stops based upon reasonable suspicion, which is a less stringent standard than probable 
cause. 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968). Police may also conduct a brief pat down for weapons in 
connection with a Terry stop. Id. at 27. 
391  City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40–41 (2000). 
392  See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451–52. 
393  See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
394  Id. 
395  See Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990). 
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individual officers’ choices. In Whren, for instance, there was a 
departmental policy limiting the circumstances in which undercover officers 
could make traffic stops.396 The primary, programmatic purpose for creating 
a specialized, undercover narcotics unit was presumably to enforce 
narcotics, not traffic, laws. The policy evinced a departmental intention 
with regard to both ends and means. Similarly, in a case like Jardines, it 
seems appropriate to assume that the primary, programmatic purpose of a 
narcotics K-9 unit is to identify criminal narcotics violations. Anytime the 
officer uses the narcotics dog, one might assume that the officer’s 
individual purpose was to advance the programmatic purpose. It would be 
strange for a K-9 officer to approach someone’s front door with the dog and 
claim that her primary purpose was community caretaking.397 Neither in 
Whren or otherwise, however, has the Court been willing to create a Fourth 
Amendment remedy for officers’ failure to behave in ways required by 
local or state institutions.398 
The critique implicit throughout Section B has been that the Court is 
insufficiently vigorous in its Fourth Amendment means-ends testing. The 
Court does not consistently require institutions to be clear about their goals 
or how to achieve them. Nor does it require such institutions to prevent 
their agents from behaving pretextually when implementing a noncriminal 
programmatic purpose. The latter is most troubling when the agents are 
police officers. These problems cannot be solved by doctrinal reform alone. 
C. THE PRAGMATIST’S REBUKE 
Section II’s core arguments are vulnerable to pragmatist objection. At 
the most general level, the discussion’s overarching criticism has been that 
the Court has failed to adequately develop a Fourth Amendment framework 
for analyzing state purpose. The pragmatist might counter that doing so is 
unimportant because Fourth Amendment doctrine has so little impact on 
police officers. By this view, evidentiary issues, equity concerns with 
remedy, and judges’ dispositions will have greater bearing on suppression 
outcomes than any Fourth Amendment test. 
Answering whether a constitutional violation occurred will often turn 
on factual questions. Given this structural reality, one might wonder how 
much difference it makes whether the standard for evaluating purpose is 
objective, subjective, or something else. The court’s legal conclusions will 
turn on the same facts regardless of the standard and it will usually be 
 
396  Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996). 
397  See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 406 (2006). 
398  See, e.g., Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008). 
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officers and suspects that supply those facts. Unlike most suspects, police 
officers are credible and experienced witnesses. They have typically had 
some practice conforming their observations and recollections to the 
relevant legal standard.399 Courts are likely inclined to credit their 
testimony.400 Even when this is not true, courts may be willing to overlook 
officer deception because “letting the criminal go free” seems like too high 
a cost to pay for constitutional rectitude.401 
Similarly, one might think that adopting a more formalized means-
ends test in the special needs and administrative exceptions contexts would 
make little difference to case outcomes. From a formalist’s standpoint, it 
might be more seemly if the Fourth Amendment’s means-ends lexicon 
conformed to that deployed in other constitutional contexts. While the 
Court might win some transparency points for explicitly naming its 
interpretive practice, this would not necessarily make for any change in 
outcomes. Tiered review in other constitutional contexts has not led to 
predictable and consistent results.402 Commentators have assailed the 
Court’s distinctions between strict, intermediate, and rational-basis 
review,403 some suggesting that these complex gradations actually create 
cover for the Court to behave in ad hoc ways.404 
Pragmatist critique counsels against imagining normative upshot in 
terms of doctrinal change. But the normative implications of the discussion 
in Section II need not be imagined in doctrinal terms alone. Rather, a fuller 
more consistent framework for evaluating purpose would likely impel 
significant structural reform. The next section explains why. 
III. PURPOSE AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
What would a fully developed Fourth Amendment framework for 
evaluating state purpose look like? The normative account that follows is 
offered as an ideal of liberal constitutionalism, not as a recipe for near-term 
 
399  Cf. Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 1037, 1041–42 (1996) (discussing the “systematic,” “routine,” 
“commonplace,” and “prevalent” practice of “testilying,” or police perjury to effect a 
conviction). 
400  See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 32, at 349. 
401  See id. at 350. 
402  See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Plessy, Brown, and Grutter: A Play in Three Acts, 26 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1689, 1718 (2005) (discussing the “doctrinal[] awkward[ness]” of Grutter 
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)). 
403  See sources cited supra notes 320–337 and accompanying discussion. 
404  See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 320–337 and accompanying discussion; see also 
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 493–94 (2004). 
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doctrinal reform. It endeavors to give full expression to the radical 
consequences of the preceding analysis. 
Fourth Amendment purpose has greater conceptual potential as an ex 
ante regulatory principle than as a post hoc principle of judicial review in 
individual cases. Doing so would help ensure that enforcement 
bureaucracies fairly and transparently calibrate the coercion their agents 
wield to achieve clearly defined goals. This is to embrace a means-ends 
conception of purpose.405 Simply importing a means-ends test from another 
constitutional law context, however, is unlikely to be helpful. As the 
discussion above suggests, judicial review is ill equipped to sort and 
identify the entangled motivations that often impel institutional and 
individual enforcement choices.406 
This section argues that purpose should be used as a regulatory 
principle for directly addressing mandate sprawl. Institutional responsibility 
for specific enforcement goals should be parceled precisely, and specific 
conduct rules for individual agents should flow from that purposive division 
of labor. This might mean stripping police departments of responsibility for 
noncriminal enforcement actions. For example, to the extent that a 
suspicionless DUI roadblock’s primary purpose is removing drunk drivers 
from the road, perhaps the DMV or some other entity without arrest 
authority ought to operate them. Similar parceling should occur within 
police departments so that different internal procedures apply to different 
categories of criminal enforcement based upon coerciveness—for example, 
issuing speeding tickets is significantly less coercive than making narcotics 
arrests. 
While there is an important role for courts in developing and 
implementing a purposive division of enforcement labor, that role would be 
quite different from the one that courts currently play in typical Fourth 
Amendment suppression motions.407 
If purpose is to function as an effective regulatory tool and remain true 
to its origins in liberal political theory, purpose must do two related things. 
Each is taken up in Sections A and B respectively. 
 
405  See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 320–337 and accompanying discussion; 
Goldberg, supra note 404, at 493–94. 
406  See supra Section II.B.3; see also Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 
MICH. L. REV. 761, 776 (2012) (arguing that judicial review is ill equipped to manage the 
core tensions that lie at the heart of policing in democratic society). 
407  See supra Section II.A.3(a). It would be an approach that focused to a considerably 
lesser degree on individual rights. Cf. Harmon, supra note 406, at 776–81 (critiquing the role 
of rights in regulating police). 
2. SEKHON 4/6/2017  7:02 PM 
118 SEKHON [Vol. 107 
 First, purpose should define permissible goals for police departments 
with sufficient particularity to permit meaningful comparisons. If goals are 
drawn too broadly, courts (or some other regulatory authority) cannot 
properly calibrate procedural constraints—they will be under- and 
overinclusive if too broad a range of state conduct is lumped together. The 
flip side of the coin is a typology so particularized that it forecloses 
meaningful comparisons between different incarnations of state coercion. 
An approach that evaluates government coercion on the specific facts that 
arise in individual cases might lose sight of constitutional values by getting 
caught up with narrow, empirical questions implicated by those cases.408 
Both problems currently beset Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The 
roughly hewn distinction between criminal and civil matters leads 
procedural protections to be both over- and underinclusive. And the 
transactional framing of disputes tends to obfuscate the broad institutional 
concerns that Fourth Amendment purpose analysis should implicate.409 
Second, purpose would also help minimize goal confusion and pretext. 
The state should be truthful about the goals that it seeks to advance when 
undertaking coercive action. For procedural constraints on state coercion to 
function, it must be possible to identify the actual reasons impelling a 
policy or practice. This requires that state actors be clear about their own 
goals and be truthful in representing them to other state actors and the 
public. This might be impossible for an institution that is responsible for too 
many overlapping goals—a condition defined below as “goal confusion.” 
Goal confusion and pretextual enforcement undermine efficient regulation, 
frustrate constitutional review, and undermine constituents’ ability to 
meaningfully challenge state enforcement practices. For example, voters 
might feel a good bit more supportive of a state agency collecting biometric 
data for the purpose of identifying the population’s vulnerability to a 
particular disease than for national security surveillance. A properly liberal 
state would not do the latter while claiming to do the former. 
If understood and applied in a principled way, Fourth Amendment 
purpose analysis would require significant restructuring of many 
enforcement bureaucracies, particularly police departments. This would, in 
turn have significant consequences for the regulation of individual state 
agents. The Court is right to question the practicality of delving into 
 
408  Jerry L. Mashaw made such a criticism of the Court’s procedural due process 
framework. Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for 
Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of 
Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 46–49 (1976). 
409  See sources cited supra Section II.A.3. 
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individual officer’s subjective intentions each time a Fourth Amendment 
issue arises.410 The discussion above has demonstrated, however, the 
Court’s “objective” approach obfuscates the essential nature of Fourth 
Amendment analysis.411 If enforcement bureaucracies were organized in 
terms of narrowly delimited purposes, it would be much easier to 
objectively review individual officers’ conduct. Individual conduct that 
substantially deviated from the defined institutional mandate would be per 
se unreasonable. 
A. CRIMINAL IS OVER- AND UNDERINCLUSIVE 
The Fourth Amendment imposes more stringent procedural restraints 
on the government in criminal prosecutions than in civil enforcement 
actions. As discussed, this creates incentives for an enforcement 
bureaucracy to claim it is doing the latter when it is actually doing the 
former.412 This is true despite the fact that the label criminal includes much 
state conduct that is pretty mild and excludes much that is very harsh. The 
criminal–civil binary has been the subject of extensive criticism 
elsewhere,413 so only a brief account is provided here. 
The government has been both profligate and parsimonious in using 
the label criminal. Legislatures have made extensive use of criminal law as 
a regulatory device, leading many scholars to complain of 
overcriminalization.414 The proliferation of criminal laws means that trifling 
misconduct can make one vulnerable to criminal punishment.415 Criminal 
procedure, of course, governs the investigation of all those crimes. On the 
other hand, the state treats a host of individuals quite harshly for conduct 
that is not criminal. For example, the state routinely detains individuals 
before criminal charges have been filed, undocumented immigrants pending 
their removal from the United States, individuals civilly committed for 
being dangerous to themselves or others, and so on.416 Criminal procedure 
does not apply to such civil proceedings. The Court has readily deferred to 
legislative labels even in circumstances where the label has seemed patently 
inaccurate.417 This, in effect, cedes discretionary authority to legislatures 
 
410  E.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). 
411  See supra Section II.A.3. 
412  See supra Section II.B.3. 
413  See supra Section II.B.3. 
414  See, e.g., Erika Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 
713, 713 n.49 (2005). 
415  See id. at 713–14. 
416  See sources cited supra notes 361–362 and discussion. 
417  See sources cited supra notes 361–362 and discussion. 
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and enforcement bureaucracies to strategically dodge criminal procedure’s 
requirements by designating enforcement actions civil. The New York 
junkyard inspection regulation at issue in Burger is a good example.418 
Some scholars have suggested abandoning the binary entirely. For 
example, Isachaar Rosen-Zvi and Talia Fisher have advocated for a case-
by-case approach to determining procedural protections. They would leave 
it to courts to determine the procedural protections that should apply in any 
particular case based upon the relative power of the parties, the stakes of the 
litigation, and so forth.419 Rosen-Zvi and Fisher are largely concerned with 
one source of procedural protection alone, the burden of proof at trial.420 
The ad hoc approach they prescribe may be useful in identifying the 
procedures required for fair adjudication. It is not, however, helpful for 
structuring fair enforcement action in advance of litigation. A more nuanced 
and modulated approach is necessary and limned below. 
Regulating enforcement activity requires firm categories ranked by 
coerciveness so that appropriate procedural rules may be crafted ex ante.421 
While the criminal–civil binary is probably too general to serve that 
purpose effectively, a more detailed and graduated typology could. New 
categories should reflect meaningful differences in the severity of the state’s 
intrusiveness and potential consequences of that intrusiveness. Investigating 
a seatbelt violation, for example, should not be subject to greater procedural 
protections than an invasive home visit by a social worker.422 
The identity and authority of the state agent should be an important 
factor in tailoring procedural restraints upon that agent’s investigatory 
power. A state actor that has the power to arrest or undertake other 
comparably severe action should, other things being equal, be subject to 
greater procedural restrictions than one that does not. These intuitions are 
developed further in the section that follows. 
 
418  See sources cited supra notes 380–385. 
419  See Rosen-Zvi & Fisher, supra note 31, at 84–87. 
420  See id. 
421  Contrary to Rosen-Zvi and Fisher, I am assuming that there will be no practical 
opportunity for a neutral referee to consider the parties’ relative strength vis-à-vis one 
another in advance of enforcement action. 
422  See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 317–18 (1971) (concluding that mandatory 
home visit by case worker of state aid recipient was neither a search nor unreasonable). 
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B. PRETEXT AND GOAL CONFUSION 
Even if permissible goals are delimited finely, another problem 
remains: Those goals must be parceled in a manner that limits “goal 
confusion” and pretext. 
A liberal state should transparently pursue goals.423 Unique 
transparency challenges arise when the state vests an actor—whether 
institution or individual—with responsibility for advancing a broad range of 
goals. The state actor may claim to be pursuing one goal when it is actually 
pursuing another. The incentives to do this will be particularly pronounced 
where goals overlap with some subject to more stringent procedural 
restrictions than others. If two goals overlap such that accomplishing one 
goes reasonably far in accomplishing the other and the latter is more 
procedurally “costly” to pursue, the state actor will have incentive to claim 
that it is pursuing the former even if it is pursuing the latter. Returning to 
Burger, the police will always have incentive to claim that they are 
regulating junkyards even if punishing thieves was a significant goal.424 
Teasing the two goals apart in advance of the search would have been 
difficult since the legislature entangled them. When enforcement 
bureaucracies are charged with entangled goals in this way, it will be 
difficult if not impossible for the bureaucracy or its agents to honestly rank 
goals for any practice or policy that advances them simultaneously—that is 
to say, there will be goal confusion.425 
Municipal police departments are particularly vulnerable to goal 
confusion. They are tasked with a broad range of goals, many of which are 
not even nominally criminal.426 As a consequence, municipal police 
departments are often first responders for a host of social ills.427 This goal 
proliferation carries over into individual officers’ responsibilities. But the 
power to arrest always lurks in the background—the goal of getting a “good 
collar” likely overlaps with each of the wide variety of other goals a patrol 
officer is responsible for advancing in a given workday.428 It is no wonder 
that courts have trouble distinguishing official justification from ulterior 
motive in Fourth Amendment cases. At least some members of the Court 
 
423  See supra Section II.B.1. 
424  See sources cited supra notes 353−360 and accompanying discussion. 
425  See supra Section II.B.2. 
426  See, e.g., Debra Livingston, Police, Community Caretaking, and the Fourth 
Amendment, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 261, 261 (1998). 
427  See id. at 271–73. 
428  For a detailed and intimate portrait of a patrol officer’s workday routines, see 
CONLON, supra note 238, at 14−38. 
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seem to recognize that pretext and goal confusion are problems.429 But it is 
practically impossible for the court, post hoc, to disentangle and rank goals 
that were entangled by design. 
The beginning of a solution to pretext and goal confusion would be for 
courts to simply assume that a state agent’s purpose is always that which 
corresponds to the most severe brand of coercive authority she wields. 
Under this approach, courts would just assume that police officers’ and 
departments’ purpose is always to make arrests—even when they claim 
otherwise in a particular case. This would mark a dramatic doctrinal shift. 
Not only would it be easier for courts to apply than current formulations of 
purpose analysis, it would create incentives for the state to disaggregate and 
assign goals in institutionally appropriate ways. Such structural reform 
would not only reduce pretext and goal confusion, it would make it easier 
for courts to review individual and institutional state practices for either.430 
The endgame would be a goal-delimited disaggregation of 
enforcement bureaucracies. Section 1 below sketches the outlines of such 
reform for criminal versus noncriminal goals.431 Section 2 does the same for 
criminal goals based upon seriousness. 
1. Purpose and Institutional Role 
Disaggregating criminal from noncriminal police functions would help 
make the motivations for police behavior more transparent. In Burger, for 
instance, the fact that sworn police officers were responsible for carrying 
out an ostensibly administrative search created a powerful appearance of 
pretext. At the very least, there must have been goal confusion: the 
administrative scheme’s goal of decreasing auto theft was coterminous with 
that of criminal theft. Nonetheless, the Court explicitly rejected the 
 
429  See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 716 n.27 (1987); Bertine v. Colorado, 
479 U.S. 367, 381 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
430  There may be a host of additional benefits. For example, Eric Miller has argued that 
role-based regulation of policing (as distinguished from the current approach of rule-based 
regulation) could bolster police legitimacy in minority neighborhoods. Eric Miller, Role-
Based Policing: Restraining Police Conduct Outside the “Legitimate Investigative Sphere,” 
94 CALIF. L. REV. 617, 621, 643−44 (2006). Miller argues, for example, that different state 
actors should be responsible for enforcing serious crimes as opposed to petty, order-
maintenance type infractions. Id. at 664−66. Nonsworn personnel might be more effective at 
responding to the latter without engendering community resentment. Id. 
431  “Criminal” is used here and through the remaining sections in a rough, colloquial 
way as opposed to the more technical way that it was when discussion the criminal–civil 
binary. See supra Section III.A. 
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possibility of requiring the state to use nonsworn officers to carry out its 
administrative scheme.432 It did so without any serious explanation.433 
One can see the outlines for such an approach in some of the Court’s 
earlier administrative search cases. For instance, in fire investigations, a 
plurality of the Court subjected the state to higher procedural constraints 
when its goal was identifying an arsonist as opposed to just identifying the 
causes of the fire in order to prevent reoccurrence.434 Where the purpose of 
a state investigation is identifying an individual for punishment, procedural 
constraints should be stringent to ensure accuracy and minimize invasions 
of privacy and liberty.435 But where the state’s purpose is to prevent future 
reoccurrence, less stringent procedural standards are necessary because the 
state’s purpose advances social good without posing a high threat to 
individual liberty, privacy, or dignity.436 Where the investigator’s purpose is 
the former, she must obtain a criminal warrant upon a showing of probable 
cause.437 Where the investigator’s purpose is noncriminal, she must obtain 
an administrative warrant, which requires a lesser showing.438 These two 
functions may be intertwined in a fire inspection, but primary responsibility 
for each will often fall upon a different actor’s shoulders—criminal 
investigator versus fire inspector. That helps courts avoid tortured purpose 
analysis. Similarly, in Camara, the Court held that building code inspectors 
would be subject to less stringent procedural constraints than police officers 
investigating a crime.439 Again, given the state’s goal, it makes sense that 
procedural restrictions would be relatively more relaxed than would be true 
for more potentially coercive state action like a criminal investigation. In 
both cases, however, an institutional division of labor was already in place. 
The Supreme Court would have done well to incentivize legislatures to 
create more such divisions of labor. But in Burger, the Court passed on the 
opportunity: “[W]e decline to impose upon the States the burden of 
requiring the enforcement of their regulatory statutes to be carried out by 
specialized agents.”440 
 
432  Burger, 482 U.S. at 717−18. 
433  See id. 
434  See Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 294 (1984) (plurality opinion). 
435  Id. at 294–95. 
436  See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 510 (1978). 
437  Clifford, 464 U.S. at 294–95 (plurality opinion). 
438  Id. The Court, however, has not had occasion to decide what if any application 
Horton and the plain-view exception has in the context of fire inspections. See sources cited 
supra notes 104−106 and accompanying discussion. 
439  See supra notes 165−168 and accompanying discussion. 
440  Burger, 482 U.S. at 718. 
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Had the Court done otherwise in Burger, one could imagine any 
number of cases turning out differently. For example, the Court might have 
refused to allow police-department-directed roadblocks. Limiting police 
departments to the use of such tactics for a primary purpose other than 
ordinary crime control is to invite goal confusion and pretextual 
enforcement.441 The mechanism that a police department is likely to use at a 
drunk driving roadblock is making arrests for violating criminal drunk 
driving laws.442 Unless the department forbade officers from making arrests, 
it is impossible to cabin the broad public policy goal of minimizing drunk 
driving from the crime control mechanism that is used to advance it. A 
better approach would be to charge an entirely different bureaucracy with 
responsibility for advancing the public policy objective where this kind of 
constitutional tension exists between means and ends. To the extent that a 
roadblock’s goal is removing unsafe drivers from the road—this must be 
the primary purpose for a suspicionless search at a DUI roadblock for it to 
be constitutional443—perhaps it should be the Department of Motor 
Vehicle’s duty to administer it. The DMV has the authority to suspend a 
driver’s license, but not to make arrests. 
Such purposive division of labor could also occur within an institution 
by creating firewalls between different categories of state agents. For 
example, in theory an inventory search is only permitted for the purpose of 
protecting a police department from liability and from dangerous items.444 
There is no reason why sworn officers should perform this function, let 
alone those officers who made the decision to impound a particular vehicle. 
Where an investigating officer has discretion to order a vehicle impounded 
and is then permitted to engage in a thoroughgoing search of the vehicle 
without probable cause, we should expect rational officers to use this 
authority pretextually whenever efficient to do so. This is notwithstanding 
that unsworn personnel could readily carry out inventory searches pursuant 
to standardized rules without revealing the results to the investigating 
officers or prosecutors. 
Similarly, nonsworn personnel might be charged with responding to 
community caretaking exigencies that do not appear to implicate any 
criminal law violation. Lower procedural protections are defensible where 
the state’s purpose for violating an individual’s privacy is to help her rather 
 
441  See supra Section II.B.3. 
442  See supra Section II.B.2. 
443  See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990). 
444  Bertine v. Colorado, 479 U.S. 367, 371−72 (1987). 
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than to target her for criminal investigation.445 There are any number of 
quotidian exigencies that might compel a state agent to violate an 
individual’s privacy or liberty interest: entering someone’s home to prevent 
death or serious injury;446 forcibly administering narcotics overdose 
medication or seizing narcotics that might cause an overdose;447 or even 
removing agitated bees from an urban beekeeper’s tenement hives.448 These 
are circumstances where we might expect state agents to intervene—and 
there is a powerful liberal rationale for requiring lower procedural restraints 
upon such interventions in comparison to those designed to identify 
criminal wrongdoing.449 It is this intuition that animates the community 
caretaking exception.450 But the exception’s integrity is undercut by 
permitting sworn officers to make arrests while searching pursuant to it.451 
The solution lies not in prohibiting community caretaking, but requiring 
that nonsworn personnel perform these ostensibly noncriminal searches and 
seizures. The same approach should be adopted for the DNA testing 
authorized in King. If the only permissible constitutional goal is arrestee 
identification,452 the personnel charged with carrying out that goal should be 
segregated from the police officers responsible for investigating other 
crimes the arrestee may be responsible for. 
This is to invoke what Eric Miller has termed “role-based conceptions 
of . . . [state] authority.”453 Miller develops the notion in a different 
context—exploring the consequences of so-called order-maintenance 
policing on the state’s legitimacy in minority communities.454 Miller argues 
that relying on sworn officers to police low-level public order disturbances 
in the hopes of preventing more serious crimes in minority communities—
what Miller terms “escalation”—undermines the state’s legitimacy in those 
 
445  See Livingston, supra note 426, at 273−74. 
446  See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 406 (2006). 
447  See J. David Goodman, In Expanded Program, Officers Across New York City Will 
Carry Antidote for Heroin Overdoses, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com
/2014/05/27/nyregion/in-expanded-program-officers-across-new-york-city-will-carry-
antidote-for-heroin-overdoses.html?_r=0. 
448  See Frank Rosario & Kirsten Conley, Beehive Relocated to New Home atop Waldorf 
Astoria Hotel, N.Y. POST, May 27, 2014, http:// nypost.com/2014/05/27/beehive-relocated-
to-new-home-atop-waldorf-astoria-hotel. 
449  See sources cited supra notes 318–320. 
450  See Stuart, 547 U.S. at 406. 
451  See Miller, supra note 430, at 622. 
452  See sources cited supra notes 202−209 and accompanying discussion. 
453  See id.; Miller, supra note 430, at 622. 
454  Miller, supra note 430, at 630. 
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communities. Accordingly, he advocates for assigning order-maintenance 
type enforcement to nonsworn personnel.455 
A purposive division of labor could minimize goal confusion and 
pretext without creating role formalism that precludes appropriate responses 
to serious crimes. One might reasonably wonder what nonsworn, state 
agents would do if they confronted evidence of criminal wrongdoing in the 
course of performing their work. What is the building inspector to do when 
she encounters evidence of criminal misconduct in the course of conducting 
an inspection? There is no categorical answer here, but there should be 
some instances where prosecution is foreclosed in order to preserve the 
integrity of a purposive division of labor. For example, evidence of modest 
narcotics possession should not be the basis for prosecution when seized 
following an inventory search. Such a rule would prevent sworn officers 
from pretextually ordering vehicle impoundments where they have a hunch, 
but no probable cause that a narcotics violation has occurred. 
There may be situations where prosecutors should be permitted to rely 
upon criminal evidence identified by a state agent in the course of a 
noncriminal search. For example, when the agent comes upon evidence of a 
particularly grave criminal offense, we should encourage her to inform the 
police. The housing inspector cannot be expected to ignore a dead body that 
she happens upon while carrying out a building inspection pursuant to an 
administrative warrant. While that is the sort of evidence that no one could 
or should ignore, perhaps evidence of drug use or sales is. The building 
inspector would view all such evidence through the lens of her official role 
as determined by her agency’s programmatic purpose. To the extent that 
housing inspectors rely upon citizen complaints and cooperation to ensure 
code compliance, that might counsel in favor of “looking the other way” 
with some criminal wrongs, but not others. The choice need not be left to 
individual agents. In the first instance, a building inspector might report the 
existence of criminal evidence to an official within her own bureaucracy 
who, in turn, pursuant to some internal guidelines, would make a decision 
as to whether to alert the police or not. 
Using purpose to parcel institutional responsibilities would not just 
reduce goal confusion and pretext. When necessary, courts would be able to 
more readily identify the purpose impelling both institutional and individual 
action. Rather than delving into the subjective workings of the latter’s 
consciousness, courts could simply evaluate whether her investigative 
 
455  Id. at 665−66. 
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conduct was consistent with her organization’s programmatic purpose. 
Where the answer was “no,” the search would be unconstitutional. 
The reform proposed here is far-ranging and would require politically 
contentious and potentially expensive institutional reform. These 
constraints may make full realization of a purposive division of labor 
impractical. But the proposal here is not “all or nothing.” Any effort to 
control police departments’ mandate sprawl would be an improvement. 
This might entail assigning some noncriminal task to other social service 
agencies. It might also mean better segregating sworn from nonsworn task 
assignment within police departments. 
2. A Purposive Typology of Criminal Enforcement 
This Article’s core insight also applies within the ambit of criminal 
law enforcement. Even if limited to criminal law enforcement, police 
departments would still be responsible for pursuing a wide of range of 
enforcement goals. Eric Miller’s work identifying the unique dangers of 
order-maintenance policing is, again, illustrative.456 But the problem is 
broader. The tactics that departments use in pursuing different goals 
generate different threats to privacy, liberty, and democratic transparency. 
The use of specialized units highlights this fact. Most medium and large 
police departments rely upon specialization. Specialized units, such as those 
targeting narcotics crimes, may be significantly more arrest-intensive than 
patrol units.457 Specialized units may also operate undercover, collecting 
intelligence in a manner more akin to spying than conventional patrol.458 
For example, specialized units that focus upon terrorism and organized 
crime are likely to rely upon strategies of infiltration and surveillance.459 
The N.Y.P.D.’s much-criticized efforts to identify “homegrown” Muslim 
terrorists are a case in point.460 
It may be that enforcement agencies themselves are in the best position 
to create and monitor fine-grained conduct rules for different categories of 
agents.461 Such internal rulemaking seems particularly important given the 
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Court’s repeated insistence that it has only limited ability to control officer 
behavior in the field.462 This dilemma is, in part, a function of the 
transactional framing that is pervasive in criminal procedure.463 Courts 
generally view criminal procedure cases as discrete encounters between a 
given suspect or officer rather than as broad regulatory dilemmas. Were it 
otherwise, the Court might have been slower to dismiss the kind of 
challenge that was at the center of Whren. In that case, the D.C. police 
department had a policy limiting undercover officers’ authority to conduct 
traffic stops.464 The officers in that case appear to have violated the policy, 
which is another way of saying that they deviated from the programmatic 
purpose of undercover policing. The Court, of course, was unwilling to 
create a Fourth Amendment remedy for the deviation.465 While 
constitutional criminal procedure need not be the primary mechanism for 
vindicating such deviations, courts should incentivize departments to see to 
it that their officers behave honestly and transparently with their units’ 
programmatic purposes. 
CONCLUSION 
State purpose does and should play a significant role in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. This is both on account of the concept’s 
salience as a precept of state legitimacy and the unique coerciveness of 
searches and seizures. The Court has failed, however, to develop a robust 
Fourth Amendment framework for analyzing state purpose because of 
structural impediments: transactional framing and enforcement agencies’ 
sprawling mandates. Courts typically confront Fourth Amendment issues in 
individual criminal cases and are frequently trying to untangle official 
purposes that are entangled by design. These are not problems that can be 
simply resolved by altering a legal test or creating a new one. Rather, 
Fourth Amendment purpose should be the basis for a forward-looking 
precept of institutional design. It is not for courts alone to ensure that 
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officers’ conduct properly aligns with the agency or unit’s programmatic 
purpose. All branches should be responsible for ensuring that clearly and 
specifically defined notions of purpose are used to structure institutional 
and individual mandates well in advance of any search or seizure. 
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